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THE QUEST FOR FREEDOM IN THE POST-BROWN SOUTH: 
DESEGREGATION AND WHITE SELF-INTEREST 
DAVISON M. DOUGLAS* 
INTRODUCriON 
The civil rights movement in the American South during the 
1950s and 1960s produced one of the most profound political and so-
cial readjustments in this nation's history. Communities large and 
small throughout the South confronted new racial expectations occa-
sioned by the Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education,1 the black freedom struggle of the early 1960s, and the fed-
eral civil rights legislation of the mid-1960s. Each of these events se-
verely challenged the racial status quo and ultimately forced a 
transformation in longstanding racial patterns in the American South. 
Yet the speed with which southern communities adapted to changing 
racial expectations varied widely. Some communities engaged in ra-
cial desegregation only after federal interference and considerable 
public defiance, while others took action far more quickly. 
Many scholars have examined the dynamics of racial change in 
the post-Brown South and have identified a wide variety of factors 
contributing to the speed with which southern communities desegre-
gated their schools and public accommodations. Some scholars have 
focused on the role of national civil rights leaders, such as Martin Lu-
ther King,2 or on the actions of national civil rights organizations, such 
as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP), the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), the Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and the Student Nonvio-
lent Coordinating Committee (SNCC).3 Others have emphasized the 
• Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and 
Mary. A.B., Princeton University; J.D., Ph.D., Yale University. I would like to thank Mary 
Dudziak, Paul Finkelman, David Garrow, and William Link for their helpful comments on ear-
lier drafts of this article. 
1. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
2 . See, e.g., TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 
1954-1963 (1988); DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND 
THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (1986). 
3. See, e.g., CLAYBORNE CARSON, IN STRUGGLE: SNCC AND THE BLACK AWAKENING OF 
THE 1960s (1981); ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, To REDEEM THE SouL OF AMERICA: THE SOUTHERN 
CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CoNFERENCE AND MARTIN LUTI-lER KING, JR. (1987); AuGusT MEIER 
& ELLIOTT RUDWICK, CORE: A STUDY IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1942-1968 (1973). 
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significant influence-or lack thereof-of political institutions, partic-
ularly the federal courts, Congress, and the President.4 
In recent years, however, an increasing number of scholars have 
focused on the dynamics of racial change in individual communities, 
recognizing that much of the desegregation in the post-Brown South 
took place independent of the efforts of national civil rights organiza-
tions and political initiatives. Indeed, many of the most significant 
contributions to the literature of the civil rights movement in the past 
several years have been local studies. s These studies of the dynamics 
of racial change in individual communities have examined both the 
methods employed by local black activists to make their desegregation 
demands and the response of white elites to these demands. 
This Article contributes to this analysis of racial change in the 
post-Brown South by focusing on the campaign to desegregate the 
schools and public accommodations in Charlotte, North Carolina. 
The focus on Charlotte is deliberate. Charlotte, a bustling New South 
city, has been widely perceived as one of the South's most racially 
moderate cities during the post-Brown era. In 1957, Charlotte cap-
tured national attention when it became one of the first southern cities 
4. See, e.g., CARL M. BRAUER, JoHN F. KENNEDY AND THE SECOND REcoNsTRucnoN 
(1977); ROBERT F. BuRK, THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION AND BLACK CIVIL RIGHTS 
(1984); PAUL BURSTEIN, DISCRIMINATION, JOBS, AND POLITICS: THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE NEW DEAL (1985); RICHARD 
KLUGER, SIMPLE JuSTICE: THE HISTORY oF BROWN v. BoARD oF EoucAr.roN AND BLAcK 
AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EOUAUTY (1975); GARY 0RFIELD, THE RECONSTRUcnON OF 
SoUTHERN EDuCATION: THE ScHOOLS AND THE 1964 CiviL RIGHTS Acr (1969); JACK W. 
PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LoNELY MEN: SoUTHERN FEDERAL JuDGES AND ScHOOL DESEGRE-
GATION (1961); FRANK T. READ & LuCY S. McGOUGH, LET THEM BE JUDGED: THE JUDICIAL 
INTEGRATION oF THE DEEP SouTH (1978); GERALD N. RosENBERG, THE HoLLow HoPE: CAN 
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991); J. HARVIE WILKINSON, III, FROM BROWN TO 
BAKKE. THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954-1978 (1979); Mary L. 
Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REv. 61 (1988); Michael J. Klar-
man, Brown, Racial Change, and the CivU Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REv. 7 (1994). 
5. See, e.g., JOAN T. BEIFUSS, AT THE RIVER I STAND; MEMPHIS, THE 1968 STRIKE, AND 
MARTIN LUTHER KING (1989); DAVIDS. CECELSKI, ALONG FREEDOM RoAD: HYDE COUNTY, 
NoRTH CAROLINA AND THE FATE OF BLACK SCHooLS IN THE SoUTH (1994); WILLIAM H. 
CHAFE, CIVILITIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS: GREENSBORO, NORTH CAROLINA, AND THE BLACK 
STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM (1980); DAVID R. COLBURN, RACIAL CHANGE AND COMMUNITY CRI-
SIS: ST. AUGUSTINE FLORIDA, 1877-1980 (1985); JOHN DITTMER, LoCAL PEOPLE: THE STRUG-
GLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN MISSISSIPPI {1994); CHARI.ES W. EAGLES, OUTSIDE AGITATOR: JoN 
DANIELS AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MoVEMENT IN ALABAMA (1993); RoBERT J. NoRRELL, REAP-
ING THE WHIRLWIND: THE CIVIL RIGHTS MovEMENT IN TusKEGEE (1st ed. 1985); SoUTHERN 
BUSINESSMEN AND DESEGREGATION (Elizabeth Jacoway & David R. Colburn eds., 1982); J. 
Mills Thornton, III, Municipal Politics and the Course of the Movement, in NEw DIREcnoNs IN 
CIVIL RIGHTS STUDIES 38 (Armstead L. Robinson & Patricia Sullivan eds., 1991); J. Mills Thorn-
ton, III, Challenge and Response in the Montgomery Bus Boycott of 1955-1956,33 ALA. L. REv. 
163 (1990). See also Clayborne Carson, Civil Rights Reform and the Black Freedom Struggle, in 
THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 19 (Charles W. Eagles ed., 1986); Steven F. Lawson, 
Freedom Then, Freedom Now, 96 AM. HIST. REv. 456 (1991). 
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to voluntarily desegregate its public schools-and with little confiict-
in contrast to the simultaneous and tumultuous integration of the Lit-
tle Rock schools.6 In 1962, the Charlotte School Board was one of the 
first boards in the South to adopt a pupil assignment plan based in 
part on geography rather than race.7 In 1963, the city again captured 
national attention by voluntarily desegregating its public accommoda-
tions a full year before the Civil Rights Act of 1964 required such 
action.8 
This focus on Charlotte permits an examination of the process of 
racial change in the moderate South. Some scholars who have ex-
amined the black freedom struggle in the moderate South have con-
cluded that expressions of moderation actually served to inhibit racial 
change by establishing a veneer of racial liberalism that helped defuse 
efforts to secure greater integration.9 Such conclusions are borne out 
in many moderate southern cities, where expressions of moderation 
masked a desire to preserve traditional racial patterns of separation 
and where early, but token, desegregation deflected attention to more 
recalcitrant southern communities.10 
But the moderate southern community differed from its recalci-
trant counterpart in at least one significant aspect. These communities 
understood that white self-interest demanded a certain degree of ac-
commodation to integration demands. Thus, in many moderate 
southern cities, white elites, especially business leaders, played critical 
roles in facilitating limited racial integration as a means of preserving 
a strong business environment. At the same time, this need to appear 
racially moderate provided the black community with an important 
opportunity to challenge racial segregation that activists successfully 
exploited in many southern communities. 
The desegregation experience in Charlotte confirms, in large 
measure, the conclusions of those who have noted the correlation be-
tween the success of desegregation initiatives and a community under-
standing that economic goals were more important than adherence to 
traditional racial patterns. Previous studies of the desegregation ex-
periences in individual southern communities have suggested that 
those communities that desegregated schools and public accommoda-
6. See infra text accompanying notes 86-91. 
7. See infra text accompanying notes 138-40. 
8. See infra text accompanying notes 174-186. 
9. See CHAFE, supra note S, at 8-10; Davison M. Douglas, The Rhetoric of Moderation: 
Desegregating the South During the Decade After Brown, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 92, 95-98 (1994). 
10. See, e.g., Douglas, supra note 9, at 137-39. 
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tions relatively early were influenced by the support of a white busi-
ness class that favored such action.11 The experience in Charlotte is 
consistent with those findings. In each instance wherein Charlotte en-
gaged in early desegregation, the city's black community threatened 
racial disruption through either litigation or public protest. Fearing 
the negative. impact of racial strife on the city's strong economic cli-
mate, Charlotte's white business elite, closely allied with the city's 
elected officials, took action to fend off black protest by engaging in 
voluntary but token integration in advance of most other southern cit-
ies. What distinguished Charlotte and its moderate counterparts like 
Atlanta and Dallas from more obstreperous southern communities 
like Birmingham and New Orleans was not so much a philosophical 
embrace of racial integration but rather a calculated understanding 
that controlled desegregation could serve broader economic interests. 
Yet the desegregation experience in Charlotte can be further dis-
tinguished from that of other moderate southern cities. The compari-
son of Charlotte with Greensboro, North Carolina, is particularly 
instructive. Like Charlotte, Greensboro captured national attention 
in 1957 when it joined Charlotte as one of the first southern cities to 
integrate its schools voluntarily without a court order. Moreover, 
both Charlotte and Greensboro are medium-sized cities located in the 
urban Piedmont section of a state that studiously avoided open defi-
ance of the Brown decision.12 Yet despite the presence in Greensboro 
of a better educated and more politically active black community that 
pressed its racial demands more aggressively than its counterpart in 
Charlotte, racial desegregation generally came sooner and with less 
conflict in Charlotte, particularly public accommodations desegrega-
tion.13 The difference between Charlotte and Greensboro is largely 
11. See. e.g., SouTHERN BusiNESSMEN AND DESEGREGATION, supra note 5; JAMES C. CoBB, 
THE SELUNG oF THE SoUTH: THE SoUTHERN CRusADE FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT, 1936-
1980 (1982); M. Richard Cramer, School Desegregation and New Industry: The Southern Com-
munity Leaders' Viewpoint, 41 Soc. FoRCES 384 (1963); David A. Horowitz, White Southerners' 
Alienation and Civil Rights: The Response to Corporate Liberalism, 1956-1965,54 J .S. HIST. 173, 
188-89 (1988). 
12. See Douglas, supra note 9, at 104-19. 
13. In 1960, the percentage of blacks in Greensboro with a college education was more than 
twice that in Charlotte. U .S. BuREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. CENsus OF PoPULATION AND HousiNG: 
1960 (1961). A black candidate in Greensboro won election to the city council in 1951, fourteen 
years earlier than in Charlotte. CHAFE, supra note 5, at 35-37; Randy Penniger, The Emergence 
of Black Political Power in Charlotte, North Carolina: The City Council Tenure of Frederick 
Douglass Alexander, 1965-1974 (1989) (unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of North Carolina 
at Charlotte). Demonstrations seeking lunch counter desegregation in 1960 and public accom-
modations desegregation in 1963 began sooner in Greensboro than in Charlotte and with larger 
numbers. See infra text accompanying notes 102, 194-96. Black leaders in Charlotte were, for the 
most part, less militant than their counterparts in other North Carolina cities such as Greens-
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due to the differing response of the white business and political elite-
especially the mayor-to racial demands. Charlotte's white elite, 
under the direction of Mayor Stanford Brookshire, was considerably 
more active in resolving racial conflict and far more willing to expend 
its moral and political capital to those ends than was the white elite in 
Greensboro.14 The experience in other moderate southern cities con-
firms the positive correlation between an active white elite and the 
speed with which desegregation took place.15 
At the heart of Charlotte's acquiescence in limited desegregation 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s lies its white business elite's desire to 
retain control over the city's carefully nurtured public image.16 When 
black activists mounted a serious threat to that image through threat 
of litigation or public demonstrations, the city's white elite quickly ne-
gotiated limited integration. The Charlotte School Board chose to en-
gage in the voluntary integration of its schools in 1957 because it 
understood that allowing four black children to attend a white 
school-in a school system with over 50,000 students-could prevent 
judicial control over the school system and pupil mixing of an even 
greater magnitude. Similarly, in 1962, the city's school board adopted 
a pupil assignment plan based in part on geography because it under-
stood that without such a plan, the system was vulnerable to legal 
challenge with uncertain results. In 1963, the city's business leaders 
capitulated quickly to black leaders' demands for integrated public ac-
commodations, recognizing that to do otherwise could lead to wide-
spread demonstrations that would paint an unflattering portrait of the 
city's race relations. By controlling the pace of integration in each of 
these instances, integration remained token and minimally intrusive, 
while the white business elite retained control over the city's eco-
nomic and public life. 
By the same token, the black community in Charlotte, as in other 
southern communities, understood that the white elite's need to pre-
boro, Durham, and Winston-Salem. ALEX CoFFIN, BRoOKSHIRE AND BELK: BusiNESSMEN IN 
Crrv HALL 43-44 (1994). Yet they would enjoy greater success forcing racial desegregation. 
14. See infra text accompanying notes 194-97. 
15. See CHAFE, supra note 5; SOUTHERN BUSINESSMEN AND DESEGREGATION, supra note 5. 
16. WiUiam Chafe, Greensboro, North Carolina: Perspectives on Progressivism, in SouTH-
ERN BUSINESSMEN AND DESEGREGATION, supra note 5, at 69 (noting that "older forms of 
(white] control had simply taken on a new appearance" during the post-Brown era in Greens-
boro); Steven F. Lawson, From Sit-in to Race Riot: Businessmen, Blacks, and the Pursuit of 
Moderation in Tampa, 1960-1967, in SOUTI-lERN BUSINESSMEN AND DESEGREGATION, supra note 
5, at 258-59 (noting the way in which white elites had used racial segregation and disfranchise-
ment as a means of social control in the early twentieth century and to lure new capital to the 
South). 
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serve a favorable public image provided an opportunity to challenge 
the racial status quo. The black community exploited that opportu-
nity by embracing two effective strategies: judicial action and public 
demonstrations.17 Local black activists understood that the city's 
white leaders feared the intervention of external judicial authority, 
and that the city would compromise on race issues to avoid the inter-
vention of such authority. Indeed, the courts, as they grew more re-
ceptive to the interests of black litigants during the early 1960s, 
provided an effective external authority that black activists could and 
did exploit. Similarly, the city's black activists understood that racial 
demonstrations exposed the city-and its image-to the whims of 
negative public opinion. Aware that Charlotte's business elite feared 
their city becoming another Little Rock or Birmingham, black activ-
ists skillfully used demonstrations and the threat of demonstrations in 
the early 1960s to force various forms of integration. Hence, the abil-
ity of the city's black community to challenge white control through 
both litigation and demonstrations proved highly effective during 
much of the post-Brown era. 
Many studies of the dynamics of racial change in the post-Brown 
South conclude with the mid-1960s. Yet the process of racial integra-
tion in Charlotte is greatly illuminated by a consideration of the bus-
ing controversy of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The desire of the 
white elite to control integration was tested in an unparalleled manner 
in Charlotte by the demands for school busing. By the late 1960s, 
Charlotte operated one of the most thoroughly integrated urban 
school systems in the United States pursuant to a pupil assignment 
plan that had received the blessing of the federal courts.18 Thus, when 
confronted with additional integration demands in 1969 and 1970 that 
required extensive school busing to overcome residential segregation, 
the white business and political elite of Charlotte proved unrespon-
17. On a few occasions, the black community also successfully utilized a third source of 
external authority to challenge the racial status quo: the Kennedy Administration. The ability 
of the black community to access the power of the Kennedy Administration contributed to the 
successful desegregation of the city's hospitals. See infra text accompanying notes 160, 217. 
Many scholars have debated the comparative efficacy of litigation and direct action as a 
means for securing racial change. The experience of Charlotte teaches that both methods of 
challenging segregation were effective and often worked in tandem with one another. In the 
early 1960s, the demonstrations challenging segregated public accommodations proved more ef-
fective because of the powerful negative public image associated with separate accommodations, 
while at the same time legal avenues challenging segregated accommodations were limited. In 
the late 1960s, when the issue shifted to the use of school busing to overcome residential segrega-
tion, litigation proved more effective because of a receptive judiciary and stronger resistance 
within the white community to this type of integration. 
18. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1966) (en bane). 
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sive. For the first time in its history, the city's white elite ceded con-
trol over the pace of integration to an outside agency: the federal 
courts. This shift took place for two reasons: first, a significant por-
tion of the city's white leaders remained convinced that the busing 
demands of the local federal judge were illegitimate and would be so 
demonstrated through the appellate process; second, massive urban 
school integration presented demands of an entirely different magni-
tude than did the desegregation of public accommodations or the ad-
mission of a few black children to white schools.19 
Although eventually many of the city's business leaders came to 
accept the reality of school busing, their silence during the height of 
the busing controversy created a vacuum of authority and ultimately 
allowed other community groups and interests to gain legitimacy and 
political power. As a result, during the 1970s, Charlotte experienced a 
transformation in the city's political power structure, with a redistribu-
tion of power away from the white business class in the direction of 
community and neighborhood groups throughout the city. Thus, the 
integration demands of the late 1960s and early 1970s not only trans-
formed the racial climate of Charlotte, they also transformed the dis-
tribution of political power in the city.20 
The desegregation experience in Charlotte is consistent with the 
experience in other moderate southern cities in which white elites 
helped facilitate limited integration in response to increased black de-
mands.21 Yet the unique aspects of the Charlotte experience-in par-
ticular the city's eagerness to prevent racial unrest at all costs-further 
confirms the value of examining the dynamics of racial change in the 
post-Brown South through the lens of individual communities. 
I. CHARLOTTE RESPONDS TO THE Brown Decision 
A. Charlotte and The Pursuit of Prosperity 
Throughout the twentieth century, Charlotte thrived as one of the 
fastest growing cities in the South.22 Unlike many other twentieth-
19. See infra text accompanying notes 253-55. 
20. See infra text accompanying notes 294-95. 
21. For example, in Atlanta, Dallas, and Tampa, local business leaders took leadership roles 
in facilitating racial change. Not surprisingly, each of these cities were vibrant "New South" 
cities that had experienced dramatic economic and population growth in the twentieth century 
and that valued continued economic prosperity over the preservation of complete racial segrega-
tion. Elizabeth Jacoway, An Introduction: Civil Rights and the Changing South, in SoUTHERN 
BUSINESSMEN AND DESEGREGATION, supra note 5, at 11. 
22. In the eleven states of the old Confederacy-excluding Texas-eighteen towns and cit-
ies had a larger population than did Charlotte in 1900: Newport News, Norfolk, Richmond, 
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century southern cities of similar size, Charlotte was a relatively insig-
nificant town for much of the nineteenth century.23 In the latter years 
of the nineteenth century, the opening of a large number of cotton 
mills transformed Charlotte into one of the region's leading textile 
centers. By 1903, half of the looms and spindles in the South were 
located within a hundred miles of the city.24 The growth of banking 
and the distribution of manufactured goods in the early twentieth cen-
tury helped solidify Charlotte's status as the leading commercial 
center in the state. By the 1990s, Charlotte would become the third 
largest banking center in the United States and rival Atlanta as the 
retail and trade center of the Southeast. The favorable placement of 
roads and highways in the twentieth century facilitated the rapid 
growth of Charlotte's trucking industry; in time, the city would also 
become one of the leading trucking centers in the United States.25 
The city's economic prosperity of the twentieth century has been ac-
companied by extraordinary population growth. Since 1900-at 
which time about 20,000 people lived in Charlotte-the city's popula-
tion has more than doubled every twenty years, with a current popula-
tion of over 400,000.26 
Charlotte had prospered during this century as a result of an un-
flagging commitment to the development of new business and indus-
try. Charlotte's leaders understood early on the value of business 
development, and hence, have consistently engaged in vigorous pro-
Roanoke, Columbia, Atlanta, Macon, Savannah, Jacksonville, Montgomery, Birmingham, Mo-
bile, New Orleans, Little Rock, Knoxville, Chattanooga, Memphis, and Nashville. By 1960, 
there were only eight such cities: Richmond, Norfolk, Atlanta, Miami, Birmingham, New Orle-
ans, Memphis, and Nashville. By 1990, there were only four: Jacksonville, New Orleans, Mem-
phis, and Nashville. DoNALD B. Dono, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE STATES OF THE UNITED 
STATES: Two CENTURIES OF CENSUS, 1790-1990, at 443-61 (1993). 
23. Charlotte's economy in the early nineteenth century depended in significant measure on 
gold mining, but the discovery of gold in California in the 1840s undermined this aspect of the 
Charlotte economy. LEGETTE BLYTHE & CHARLES R. BROCKMANN, HoRNET's NESr. THE 
STORY oF CHARLOTTE AND MECKLENBURG CouNTY 267 (1961). Charlotte and its surrounding 
area had few substantial slaveowners during the ante-bellum era. In 1850, only three families in 
all of Mecklenburg County-home to Charlotte-owned more than fifty slaves. Damaria E. 
Leach, Progress Under Pressure: Changes in Charlotte Race Relations, 1955-1965, at 7 (1976) 
(unpublished M.A. thesis, University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill)). 
24. Leach, supra note 23, at 4. 
25. Tournament Invigorates Charlotte, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1994, at 7A; Thomas Hanchett, 
Sorting Out the New South City: Charlotte and Its Neighborhoods 458 (1993) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill)). 
26. 2 U .S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1950: CHARACTERISTICS OF 
THE POPULATION: NORTH CAROLINA Pt. 33 (1952); U.S. BuREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. CENSUS 
OF POPULATION AND HOUSING: 1960: CHARL01TE, N.C. 13 (1960); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CEN-
SUS, 1990 CENsus OF PoPuLATION AND HousiNG: SuRVEY PoPULATION AND HousiNG CHAR-
ACTERISTICS: NORTH CAROUNA, 1990, at 17 (1993); Now We'll Be City, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, 
June 30, 1991, at 1D; Hanchett, supra note 25, at 191. 
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motion and protection of the city's image as a good place to do busi-
ness. Although in the early years of the twentieth century Charlotte's 
economy depended in large measure on textile manufacturing, by the 
middle of the century the city's economy had considerably diversified, 
far more than had other North Carolina cities. 
Throughout much of this century, the Charlotte Chamber of 
Commerce has functioned as the most powerful institution in the city. 
Particularly during the 1950s, the Chamber led a number of important 
city reform efforts including the expansion of the city's limits and the 
consolidation of the city and county school system.27 Community ini-
tiatives that gained Chamber support generally succeeded. The 
Chamber also functioned as a keeper of the city's image, facilitating 
favorable coverage of the city in the national press.28 
The Charlotte Observer repeatedly cited the Chamber for its im-
portant role in civic affairs. In 1958, the paper noted: "[s]cratch be-
neath the surface of any local government program in Charlotte or 
Mecklenburg [County] these days and you're likely to find a Chamber 
of Commerce committee lending aid, comfort, and more than a little 
push."29 Or, in a 1960 editorial entitled Guess Who's Boss of Our 
Town, the paper wrote: "Charlotte is run, primarily and well, by its 
Chamber of Commerce .... We are pleased to acknowledge its boss-
ism and to wish it continued health."3° Columnist Ed Yoder, then of 
Greensboro, described the Chamber's importance in a 1961 column: 
"[T)he Chamber of Commerce ... is the mainspring of Charlotte, the 
clearing house for what is done politically and even culturally."31 The 
Chamber had performed this role for several decades; in 1933, Char-
lotte News reporter W.J. Cash claimed that "[n]owhere else in Dixie 
... is the Chamber of Commerce more an oracle" than in Charlotte.32 
The Chamber and the city's political leadership had always been 
closely linked. From 1935 through 1975, every Charlotte mayor, ex-
cept one, had been a Chamber member and the president or owner of 
27. As part of its activities, the Chamber frequently sponsored trips of premier business 
leaders to other American cities to study ways of resolving community problems such as urban 
renewal and park development. William T. Moye, Charlotte-Mecklenburg Consolidation: Me-
trolina in Motion 165 (1975) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina 
(Chapel Hill)). 
28. BLYTHE & BROCKMANN, supra note 23, at 138-39. 
29. Between Soup and Nuts, Progress, CHARLOTIE OBSERVER, Mar. 13, 1958, at 2B. 
30. Guess Who's Boss of Our Town, CHARLOTIE OBSERVER, Feb. 12, 1960, at 2B. 
31. Ed Yoder, Comments from a Neighboring Town, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Dec. 13,1961, 
at 28. 
32. W.J. Cash, Close View of a Calvinist Lhasa, AMERICAN MERCURY Apr. 1993, at 443, 
445. 
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his own business.33 The Chamber presidency frequently led directly to 
the mayor's office. From the early 1960s until the late 1970s, the 
mayor of Charlotte was a former president of the Chamber of Com-
merce; and the chair of the Mecklenburg County Board of Commis-
sioners during the late 1960s and early 1970s was also a former 
Chamber president.34 The Chamber frequently approached local 
business leaders and encouraged them to run for office with a promise 
of financial support. Stanford Brookshire, for example, who served as 
the city's mayor for most of the 1960s, entered the mayoral race in 
1961 at the Chamber's behest.35 A strong Chamber of Commerce 
permitted Charlotte's business elite to speak with one voice and to 
exercise considerable control over the city's economic and political 
development. When confronted with the integration demands of the 
post-Brown era, the Chamber of Commerce facilitated a unified re-
sponse that well served the city's economic interests. As a former 
Chamber president Ed Burnside commented in 1964: "Anything (the 
Chamber] back( s] goes over. "36 The influence of the Chamber of 
Commerce would prove to be an important factor in the city's resolu-
tion of racial conflict for much of the post-Brown era. 
The presence of a strong and politically active Chamber of Com-
merce was not unique to Charlotte. Throughout the South, other cit-
ies that engaged in early desegregation with minimal public turmoil-
such as Atlanta and Dallas-enjoyed the presence of a strong Cham-
ber of Commerce that wielded influence over public opinion and 
chose to exercise that influence in support of desegregation. Where 
business leaders remained silent until conflict had escalated-as in 
Birmingham and New Orleans-bitter conflict was far more likely.37 
B. Charlotte Responds to Brown 
When the Supreme Court decided the Brown case in 1954, Char-
lotte was a city of two very different worlds: one black and one white. 
Although Charlotte, for the most part, had escaped the racial conflict 
that had beset many other southern cities during the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries,38 the city's growth and development 
33. Leach, supra note 23, at 11. 
34. Moye, supra note 27, at 165. 
35. Brookshire May Run for Mayor, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Apr. 5, 1961; Interview with 
William Sturges, in Charlotte, N.C. (Oct. 12, 1992). 
36. PAT WATTERS, SOUTHERN REGIONAL COUNCIL, CHARLOTTE 21 (1964). 
37. CoBB, supra note 11, at 122-50. 
38. Yet nineteenth-century Charlotte was not without its racial incidents. In April 1875, for 
example, shortly after the passage of the federal Civil Rights Act that guaranteed equal access to 
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during the half century before Brown proceeded along well-defined 
racial lines. Although Charlotte enjoyed a high degree of residential 
integration in the nineteenth century,39 the city's rapid population 
growth in the twentieth century proceeded along well developed racial 
lines, encouraged in significant measure by racially restrictive cove-
nants that accompanied the development of most new property during 
the first half of this century.40 By the time the Supreme Court issued 
its Brown decision in 1954, Charlotte was one of the most residentially 
segregated cities in the United States-only thirteen of the one hun-
public accommodations, a black family traveling through Charlotte took a room at the down-
town Central Hotel. An angry crowd of whites forced its way into the hotel and successfully 
demanded that the black family be required to leave. The Charlotte Daily Observer, the local 
newspaper, supported the mob's actions. JACK CLAIBORNE, THE CHARLOITE OBSERVER: hs 
TIME AND PLACE, 1869-1986, at 50-51 (1986). 
39. During the nineteenth century, Charlotte, along with many southern towns, had a high 
degree of residential integration. As families clustered around the intersection of Trade and 
l}'ron streets, wealthy white homeowners were likely to live on the same block with modest 
African-American laborers. By the turn of the century, certain blocks within the city were occu-
pied exclusively by persons of one race, but very few neighborhoods had attained a racial iden-
tity. Hanchett, supra note 25, at 6, 103, 264. 
40. NORTH CAROLINA ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON 
CiVIL Rtoms, EouAL PRoTECTION OF THE LAWS IN NORTH CAROLINA 153 (1962). Gunnar 
Myrdal in his 1944 study of American race relations found that southern cities, such as Charlotte, 
that received the bulk of their black population after the Civil War, tended to be more segre-
gated than those cities that already had a large black population before the war. GuNNAR MYR-
DAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 620-21 
(1944). Charlotte was certainly one of those cities. 
Between 1900 and 1930, for example, developers created three new neighborhoods east and 
southeast of the downtown area-Elizabeth, Myers Park, and Eastover-that specifically ex-
cluded black as well as lower-income white families through racial and house-cost restrictive 
covenants, creating a haven for upper class whites. Hanchett, supra note 25, at 306-18. North 
Carolina courts enforced these racially restrictive covenants as did courts throughout the country 
until the Supreme Court's decision in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U .S. 1 (1948), declared them 
unconstitutional. See Phillips v. Weam, 37 S.E.2d 895, 8Cf7 (N.C. 1946); Vernon v. R.J. Reynolds 
Realty Co., 36 S.E.2d 710, 711 (N.C. 1945); Sheets v. Dillon, 20 S.E.2d 344, 347 (N.C. 1942); St. 
Louis Union Trust Co. v. Foster, 190 S.E. 522,529 (N.C. 1937); Eason v. Buffaloe, 152 S.E. 496, 
496-cr/ (N.C. 1930). The United States Supreme Court had expressly found that enforcement of 
racially restrictive covenants did not violate the Constitution in its earlier decision in Corrigan v. 
Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926). 
Other suburban neighborhoods developed in the early years of this century also assumed 
identities based on race and class even in the absence of racially restrictive covenants. For exam-
ple, Wesley Heights, located west of the center of town, attracted middle class whites; Villa 
Heights, Belmont, and Optimist Park north of the center of town attracted white mill workers; 
and Biddleville and Washington Heights also west of the center of town near Biddle Institute, 
attracted black middle class homeowners. Biddle, a black college founded in the aftermath of 
the Civil War by the northern Presbyterian Church and renamed Johnson C. Smith University in 
1923, would prove to be a strong draw for new black development in the area west of the center 
of town. Yet the most substantial African-American neighborhood in the early twentieth cen-
tury was Second Ward, or Brooklyn, located immediately southeast of the town square. By 1920, 
Second Ward had developed its own commercial center complete with a large number of black-
owned businesses. Hanchett, supra note 25, at 200-25, 271-302. 
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dred largest cities in the country had more residential segregation 
than Charlotte.41 
Yet, the city's black and white communities were separated by 
more than mere geography. Blacks and whites lived in disparate 
worlds in terms of income, employment, education, and quality of 
housing. In 1950, over ninety percent of the employed black men in 
the city engaged in manual labor; only about seven percent held some 
type of white collar job. On the other hand, about half of the city's 
white men held a white collar job. Likewise, over half of the city's 
working black women held low-paying jobs as domestics in white 
homes; only about ten percent of the working white women were so 
engaged. These differences were reflected in the incomes black and 
white workers earned; in 1950, the median income of white workers in 
Charlotte was more than twice that of African Americans, a disparity 
greater than every other North Carolina city and greater than most 
other upper South cities.42 This dramatic disparity in employment and 
income was due to a range of factors, one of which was the remarka-
bly different educational backgrounds of the two groups. Whereas the 
average white adult in Charlotte in 1950 had completed 12.2 grades of 
school, the average African-American adult had completed only 6.6 
grades of school,43 due in significant part to the fact that high school 
41. KARL E. T AEUBER & ALMA F. T AEUBER, NEGROEs IN CmEs: RESIDENTIAL SEGREGA-
TION AND NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE 31-34, 40-41 (1965); Analysis of Student Enrollment and 
Professional Instructional Staff of One Hundred Largest School Districts (1970) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the Julius L. Chambers Papers, Special Collections, Atkins Library, 
University of North Carolina at Charlotte). Those thirteen cities were Dallas, Flint, Fort Lau-
derdale, Jacksonville, Miami, Montgomery, Norfolk, Orlando, Richmond, Shreveport, Tampa, 
West Palm Beach, and Winston-Salem. /d. 
By 1954, the various quadrants of the city had attained a certain racial and class identity: 
African Americans lived primarily in the northwest section of the city, lower middle class whites 
lived primarily in the northeast and southwest sections of the city, and upper middle class whites 
lived primarily in the southeast section of the city. Julius Chambers, the city's most prominent 
black attorney during the 1960s and 1970s, would later comment that Charlotte could teach 
Rhodesia "something about apartheid." Chambers Will Push Integration, CHARLOTTE OB-
SERVER, June 30, 1969, at lB. 
42. Charlotte, 2.2 to one; Asheville, 1.7 to one; Durham, 1.9 to one; Greensboro-High Point, 
1.9 to one; Raleigh, 2.1 to one; Winston-Salem, 1.8 to one; Chattanooga, 1.6 to one; Memphis, 2.3 
to one; Nashville, 1.8 to one; Norfolk, 1.8 to one; Richmond, 1.9 to one; Roanoke, 1.9 to one. 
The disparities in the deep South were worse than Charlotte: Mobile, 2.4 to one; Montgomery, 
3.0 to one; Atlanta, 2.2 to one; Augusta, 2.3 to one; Savannah, 2.5 to one. U.S. BuREAU OF 
CENSUS, CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1950: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION: NORTif CAR-
OUNA, TENNESSEE, ALABAMA, GEORGIA, AND VIRGINIA (1952). 
43. BUREAU OF CENSUS, CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1950: CHARACTERISTICS OF 1HE POPU-
LATION: NORTii CAROLINA Pt. 33, at 62, 71 (1952). 
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education was not widely available for black students in North Caro-
lina until the 1940s.44 
The Brown decision constituted a challenge of unknown propor-
tions to these patterns of racial separation. Although much of the 
South reacted to Brown with cries of defiance, white Charlotte re-
acted to the decision in a muted fashion. None of the city's political 
and business leaders counseled defiance of the Court, and a few even 
endorsed the decision.45 In addition, during the first few years follow-
ing the decision, many of Charlotte's civic and business leaders helped 
facilitate the desegregation of certain aspects of the city's life. Follow-
ing Brown, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Council on Human Relations, 
a biracial organization of business and professional leaders, convinced 
managers of the city's largest department stores to open their 
restrooms to black customers and the board of directors of the Char-
lotte library to operate on a fully desegregated basis.46 In 1954, the 
Mecklenburg County Medical Society became the first society in the 
state and one of the first in the South to desegregate its professional 
membership, a decision that ultimately forced the state chapter to do 
likewise.47 Shortly thereafter, the city became one of the first south-
em cities to desegregate its bus service, in sharp contrast to the stormy 
bus boycott in Montgomery.48 A few years later, in 1960, Charlotte 
received national attention by becoming the first city in the state and 
one of the first in the South to integrate a public swimming pool; other 
North Carolina cities had closed public swimming pools rather than 
allow them to operate on a desegregated basis. 49 
44. JEFFREY CROW ET AL., A HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS IN NORTH CAROUNA 135 
(1992). 
45. For example, Claude Broach, minister at St. John's Baptist Church in downtown Char-
lotte, claimed that the Supreme Court in Brown had "echoed the conscience of the church." 
Claude Broach, Sermon 2 (1954) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Frederick Douglass 
Alexander Papers, Box 121-86, Special Collections, Atkins Library, University of North Carolina 
at Charlotte). 
46. Leach, supra note 23, at 37. 
47. Membership of Negroes Questioned, CHARLOTTE NEws, Apr. 28, 1955; N.C. Doctors 
Admit Negroes, RALEIGH NEws AND OBsERVER, May 3, 1955; CLAIBORNE, supra note 38, at 
247. The state granted black doctors "scientific" membership, but not "social" membership; full 
membership would not come until1964. Edward C. Halperin, Special Report: Desegregation of 
Hospitals and Medical Societies in North Carolina, 318 NEw ENG. J. MEn. 61-62 (Jan. 7, 1988). 
48. N.C. Negroes are Pushing Desegregation, CHARLOTIE OBSERVER, July 19, 1957, at 9A; 
Southern Regional Council, Special Report on Charlotte, Greensboro, and Winston-Salem, 
North Carolina 12 (1957) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the NAACP Papers, Box III-A-
105, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.). 
49. Bathing Pool in Charlotte Integrated, GREENSBORO DAILY NEWS, July 28, 1960, at 1A; 
Interview with Joseph Grier, in Charlotte, N.C. (July 8, 1992). 
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Much of this early desegregation was motivated by a desire to 
preserve a favorable business climate in the city. C.A. McKnight, the 
influential editor of the Charlotte Observer, was one of the first 
southerners to understand the negative economic impact of resistance 
to Brown.50 At a March 1956 symposium on North Carolina public 
affairs, McKnight argued that deteriorating race relations in the wake 
of resistance to desegregation could potentially damage the state's 
economic future.51 The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Council on Human 
Relations repeatedly emphasized that smooth adjustment to Brown 
would benefit the city's economic prospects. 52 The Council on 
Human Relations circulated a speech delivered by the executive vice-
president of the Baton Rouge Chamber of Commerce in 1956 in 
which he predicted the economic costs of resistance to Brown: "Boy-
cotts, economic reprisals, the possibility of abandoning our public 
schools, incidents of violence, irresponsible statements-these are 
new factors which will now be given consideration by industry and 
business when they consider a Southern location. "53 The Southern 
Regional Council called upon local chambers of commerce to find 
'"sensible' solutions to [school) integration petitions as a matter of 
long-range economic benefit to the region. "54 In time, many of Char-
50. The Observer had earlier had a mixed record of editorial support for racially progressive 
issues, having been a forceful proponent of white supremacy during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. CLAIBORNE, supra note 38, at 50-51; JANETfE T. GREENWOOD, BTITER-
SWEET LEGACY: THE BLACK AND WHITE 'BETTER CLASSES' IN CHARLOTTE, 1850-1910, at 189-
90 (1994). The Observer had championed the constitutional amendment of 1900 that dis-
frand!.ised black voters, heralding its passage as "one of the greatest days that ever dawned upon 
North Carolina." I d. at 212. Nevertheless, during the post-Brown era, the paper would publish 
some of the most racially liberal editorials in the South, particularly after McKnight became 
editor in early 1955. Under McKnight's leadership, throughout the various race-related crises 
that confronted the city over the course of the next two decades, the Observer usually favored 
desegregation efforts, serving as an important voice in a city confronted with the demands of 
racial change. 
51. Editor Sees Race Relations Hurt, DuRHAM MoRNING HERALD, Mar. 12, 1956, at SA. 
Other prominent newspaper editors in the state made similar claims. Reed Sarratt, executive 
editor of the Winston-Salem Journal and Sentinel, for example, noted that the state's failure to 
adapt to the Brown decision would cause "untold damage . . . to our economy." Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Council on Human Relations, Voices of Moderation (July 1956) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with Frederick Douglass Alexander Papers, Box 121-86, Special Collections, 
Atkins Library, University of North Carolina at Charlotte). 
52. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Council on Human Relations, What Would Public School De-
segregation Mean to Charlotte {1956); Charlotte-Mecklenburg Council on Human Relations, 
Role of Business Leaders (1956) (unpublished manuscripts, on file with the Charlotte-Mecklen-
burg Community Relations Committee Papers, Box 1-5, Special Collections, Atkins Library, 
University of North Carolina at Charlotte). 
53. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Council on Hum. Rei., Role of Business Leaders, supra note 52. 
54. North Carolina Council on Human Relations, HUM. REL. BuLL. 5 (Mar. 1956) (on file 
with the Frederick Douglass Alexander Papers, Box 121-86, Special Collections, Atkins Library, 
University of North Carolina at Charlotte) (quoting N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1956). 
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lotte's business leaders came to understand the value of token integra-
tion as a means of avoiding racial conflict. The tumultuous 
desegregation experience in Little Rock would loom large in the 
minds of Charlotte's business leaders for the next several years. 
Again and again, the desire to avoid becoming "another Little Rock" 
influenced the willingness of Charlotte's business elite to facilitate lim-
ited integration. 
Notwithstanding the modest desegregation efforts during the first 
few years following Brown, school integration initially posed a far 
more difficult problem. Pupil mixing aroused passions of an entirely 
different order compared to the desegregation of medical societies 
and city buses. For the first three years after Brown, the Charlotte 
and Mecklenburg County school boards did little more than study the 
issue of school desegregation; during that time period, both boards 
continued their longstanding practice of assigning children to school 
on the basis of race. 55 At the same time, the NAACP, under the lead-
ership of state president Kelly Alexander of Charlotte, sought to pres-
sure the Charlotte and Mecklenburg County school boards to 
desegregate their schools. 56 
Alexander had challenged the accommodationist attitudes of the 
state's traditional black leadership for several years.57 Beginning in 
the late 1940s, Alexander argued that significant racial progress would 
not occur in North Carolina until the black community confronted the 
55. In June 1955, the Charlotte School Board had become one of the first in the South to 
appoint a study committee to investigate methods of complying with Brown, having adopted a 
resolution that the board would seek to comply with the decision. Two N.C. Cities Begin Studies 
on Compliance With Decree, S. ScH. NEws, July 6, 1955, at 6; Nonh Carolina: The Integration 
Issue, RALEIGH NEws AND OBSERVER, Mar. 15, 1956, at 4; Pearsall Heads Schools Group; Gov-
ernor Stresses Task Ahead, RALEIGH NEws AND OBSERVER, June 22, 1955, at 1. 
56. Alexander served as one of North Carolina's leading civil rights figures for over forty 
years. Alexander founded the Charlotte branch of the NAACP in the early 1940s. In 1948, 
Alexander became statewide president of the NAACP, a position he held until 1984. In 1983, 
Alexander was elected national chair of the NAACP. NAACP State President, Long Time Civil 
Rights Leader, THE REVEALER (Raleigh, NC), Dec. 1975 (on file with Kelly Miller Alexander, 
Sr., Papers, Box 34-12, Special Cotlections, Atkins Library, University of North Carolina at 
Charlotte). Alexander's older brother Fred put his energies into politics, becoming the first 
black member of the Charlotte City Council in 1965 and, in 1974, one of the first two black 
members of the North Carolina Senate since Reconstruction. /d. 
57. For example, in his NAACP presidential address in 1949, Alexander attacked North 
Carolina blacks' "complacency as to civil rights". Kelly Alexander, Address at the Annual 
North Carolina Conference of NAACP Branches (June 12, 1949) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with the Kelly Miller Alexander, Sr., Papers, Box 1-3, Special Collections, Atkins Library, 
University of North Carolina at Charlotte). In 1951, Alexander attacked the "liberal" reputation 
of the state in_ race matters as unwarranted. These comments caused a stir in the state and 
precipitated appeals to other black leaders to oppose Alexander as too confrontational. Ray-
mond Gavins, The NAACP in North Carolina during the Age of Segregation, in NEw DIREC-
TIONS IN CIVIL RIGHTS STUDIES, supra note 5, at 113, 117. 
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state's white political leadership in the courtroom with its claims for 
racial justice.58 Under Alexander's leadership, the North Carolina 
chapter of the NAACP would be one of the most aggressive state 
chapters in the South: the organization petitioned more school boards 
and brought more school desegregation lawsuits during the 1950s than 
any other state chapter.s9 
The NAACP initially sought to achieve its desegregation goals by 
appeals to school boards without resort to litigation. One week after 
the Court announced its decision in Brown, NAACP representatives 
from seventeen southern and border states met in Atlanta to discuss 
the organization's response. The representatives agreed to ask local 
NAACP chapters to petition local school boards to abolish school seg-
regation without delay.60 As a result, Alexander coordinated a peti-
tion effort throughout North Carolina; in Charlotte, the NAACP 
presented petitions requesting desegregation to the school boards of 
Charlotte and Mecklenburg County.61 Both boards rejected the peti-
tions. In the meantime, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit held that black students could not legally challenge 
their assignment to segregated schools unless they filed a formal trans-
fer request in accord with a newly enacted North Carolina state law.62 
In response, Alexander sought to stimulate interest among Afri-
can Americans to seek transfers for their children to white schools. 
During the spring of 1957, Alexander held a number of public meet-
ings in Charlotte advising parents on the necessity of filing transfer 
applications; Alexander also approached certain parents whose chil-
dren were thought to be particularly good candidates for transfers and 
specifically encouraged them to seek assignment at a white school. 
Ultimately, Alexander persuaded forty African Americans to file 
58. Augustus M. Bums, North Carolina and the Negro Dilemma, 1930-1950, at 47 {1968) 
{unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill)); Gavins, supra note 
57, at 117-18. 
59. Desegregation Spotty as Schools Open, S. ScH. NEws, Sept. 1955, at 1; Peter Gilpin, 
N.C. Leads South in Desegregation Cases Pending or Proposed, NAACP Told Here, AsHEVILLE 
CITIZEN, Oct. 10, 1959, at 10. 
60. Atlanta Declaration {May 23, 1954) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the NAACP 
Papers, Box 11-A-227, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.). 
61. North Carolina, S. ScH. NEws, Sept. 1954, at 10; Immediate School Integration Urged, 
RALEIGH NEws & OBSERVER, Aug. 12, 1954, at 21; NAACP Will Seek Integration in Fall, CHAR-
L01TE OBSERVER, July 9, 1955, at 1A. 
62. Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724,727-28 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957). 
In the spring of 1955, the North Carolina General Assembly had enacted a new pupil assignment 
statute in which local school boards were given the authority to make initial pupil assignments. 
The statute further provided that those students dissatisfied with their initial assignment could 
request a transfer to a different school by filing a request with the school board. N.C. Gen Stat. 
§ 115-176 (1955). 
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transfer requests during the summer of 1957 with the Charlotte School 
Board.63 
Not everyone in the African-American community, however, fa-
vored school desegregation. Many black parents did not wish to sub-
ject their children to the harassment they feared would accompany 
attendance at a white school.64 Others did not perceive the benefits of 
a desegregated education and did not care to risk the retaliation that 
could accompany a transfer request. The Charlotte branch of the 
NAACP ultimately concluded that "[p ]arents find it difficult to under-
stand the harmful, detrimental psychological and educational effects 
of segregation. It is essential that we continue to educate them as to 
the meaning of [the Brown decision]."65 African Americans through-
out North Carolina who had sought entry for their children into white 
schools had suffered economic consequences for their actions; more 
than once, the national office of the NAACP had been called upon to 
help a black family suffering a foreclosure or some other adverse ac-
tion occasioned by a transfer request.66 
At the same time, a few white leaders supported modest school 
desegregation efforts. The bi-racial Charlotte-Mecklenburg Council 
63. These are 5 Negro Children Who'll Go to White Schools, CHARLOTTE OBsERVER, July 
24, 1957, at 1A. 
64. /d.; On Sept. 4, 1957, Four Young Charlotte Students Braved Fear and Uncertainty to 
Take Their Place in History as School Desegregation Pioneers, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Apr. 12, 
1992, at 1C; FRYE GAILLARD, THE DREAM LoNG DEFERRED 4 (1988). 
65. Charlotte Branch, NAACP, Implementing an Effective NAACP Program in Charlotte, 
North Carolina 18 (July 10, 1961) (unpublished manuscript, on file with NAACP Papers, Box 
111-C-112, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.). 
66. Letter from Conrad Pearson to Roy Wdkens (Nov. 20, 1959) (on file with NAACP 
Papers, Box III-A-279, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.) (NAACP offers collateral for 
mortgage of parent who had unsuccessfully sought a transfer for his children in order to forestall 
foreclosure). Some claimed that they had lost their jobs upon filing transfer requests. Testimony 
of Reginald Hawkins 25, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ (July 25, 1965) (on file 
with the Julius L. Chambers Papers, Special Collections, Atkins Library, University of North 
Carolina at Charlotte). 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, one of the most prominent black Charlotteans, Nathaniel 
Tross, criticized school desegregation efforts. Tross, who had been born in the Caribbean and 
educated at various American and English universities including Harvard and Oxford, was one 
of the most influential black ministers in the city from the 1930s until his death in 1971. Tross 
was a firm opponent of pupil mixing. When North Carolina Governor Luther Hodges proposed 
voluntary segregation in August 1955 as a means of dealing with the demands of Brown, Tross 
endorsed the Governor's plan: "We can avoid racial friction on the whole question of integration 
only on a voluntary basis. . . . I think the governor was right in castigating the false prophets of 
the NAACP." Negro Leaders Differ on Hodges' School Talk, CHARLOTTE NEws, Aug. 9, 1955, at 
1 A. Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, Tross opposed desegregation efforts, bringing him 
into public conflict with other African-American leaders. The Western North Carolina Confer-
ence of the AME Zion church, Tross's denomination, ultimately passed a resolution criticizing 
him "for the part he has played in behalf of those who would stave off integration." Leach, supra 
note 23, at 64. 
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on Human Relations supported the NAACP's integration efforts. The 
Council argued that school desegregation would bring "great prestige 
[to] Charlotte throughout the nation and the world" and would be 
"good for business. "67 The Council insisted that only a fraction of the 
black population would actually attend white schools in Charlotte be-
cause of the city's extensive residential segregation. At the same time, 
Harry Golden, the outspoken and sardonic editor of the Carolina Is-
raelite and one of the city's leading social critics, urged desegregation 
coupled with the removal of all chairs from the public schools, noting 
that whites seemed to object only to sitting, not standing, with blacks. 
Golden's "Vertical Negro Plan" received national attention.68 
Eventually the Charlotte School Board decided that allowing a 
few black students to transfer to white schools served the city's inter-
est in controlling the pace of desegregation without judicial interfer-
ence. Beginning in 1955, the Charlotte School Board met secretly 
with the school boards of Greensboro and Winston-Salem to discuss 
the eventual desegregation of their respective school systems.69 Dur-
ing the summer of 1957, the school boards of Charlotte, Greensboro, 
and Winston-Salem agreed to accept the transfer requests of a few 
African Americans to white schools for the 1957-1958 school year. 
The boards decided that each would announce on July 23 that the 
transfer requests of twelve black students in the three cities had been 
granted. In Charlotte, five students who requested a transfer were 
successful. 70 
In agreeing to voluntary desegregation in the summer of 1957, the 
Charlotte School Board operated with the understanding that this ac-
tion would fend off more extensive court-ordered desegregation. The 
Board announced that in granting the transfers, it had acted to "pre-
67. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Council on Human Relations, What Would Public School De-
segregation Mean to Charlotte, supra note 52. 
68. Golden Rule, TIME, Apr. 1, 1957, at 62. 
69. 3 N.C. Cities Assign 12 Negroes to Previously All-White Schools, S. ScH. NEws, Aug. 
1957, at 3. The school boards brought media representatives into the discussions to solicit their 
advice and cooperation; the media cooperated by declining to report on the negotiations. 
UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGIITS, CIVIL RIGHTS U.S.A.: PUBUC SCHOOLS, SOUTH-
ERN STATES, 1962, at 73 (1963). 
70. 3 N.C. Cities Assign 12 Negroes to Previously All-White Schools, supra note 69, at 3; City 
Hears School Appeals, CHARL01TE OBSERVER, Aug. 8, 1957, at 1C. 
Of the five Charlotte students who received a transfer to a white school, one moved out of 
the school district prior to the start of school, reducing the number to four. N.C. Courts Block 
Efforts to Prevent Desegregation, S. SCH. NEws, Sept. 1957, at 15. All of the students whose 
transfer applications were granted lived closer to a white school than to the black school to 
which they were initially assigned and were among the top students in their black schools. 
Among those rejected were NAACP president Alexander's children. 3 N.C. Cities Assign 12 
Negroes to Previously All-White Schools, supra note 69, at 3. 
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serve the public schools of Charlotte. "71 Both of the city's newspapers 
and a number· of respected business and professional leaders articu~ 
lated this perspective. The Charlotte Observer described the voluntary 
desegregation as a "legal and effective instrument for keeping deseg-
regation a limited and selective process" thereby avoiding "an inevita-
ble court order for mandatory desegregation," and enhancing "the 
progressive tradition of the three communities and of this state. "72 
The Charlotte News was more direct: "The Charlotte City School 
Board has acted to preserve the schools. It has acted to prevent mas-
sive, court-decreed integration."73 The Board understood the power 
of the courts to take control of the desegregation process through ju-
dicial order. Unwilling to cede such control and recognizing the social 
and economic havoc that such an effort could entail, the Board en-
gaged in token integration to prevent judicial intervention. 
This token school desegregation, however, sparked opposition 
from parts of the white community. Representatives of a white segre-
gationist organization, the Patriots of North Carolina, sought to foster 
opposition to the Charlotte School Board's decision to admit black 
children into white schools.74 Yet the Patriots had little success. In 
1957, they mailed letters to the parents of over 1000 students at Char-
lotte's Central High School, one of the schools slated to receive a 
black student, encouraging them to pull their children out of Central. 
The organization received only one favorable response, which was 
later withdrawn.75 By the following summer, the Patriots had disap-
71. /d. 
72. Wisdom, Courage, and Law Dictate a School Decision, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, July 24, 
1957, at 2B. 
73. 3 N.C. Cities Assign 12 Negroes to Previously All-White Schools, supra note 69, at 3. 
The Charlotte Chamber of Commerce also supported the School Board's actions; one year ear-
lier, the Chamber's president, Stowe Moody, had asked the Board to form a bi-racial committee 
to forge a "moderate approach" to the resolution of the city's racial problems. N.C. Assembly 
Approves Referendum on Tuition, School Closing, S. SCH. NEws, Aug. 1956, at 16. 
74. A group of prominent North Carolinians had organized the Patriots in August 1955 for 
the purpose of maintaining "the purity and culture of the white race and Anglo-Saxon institu-
tions." Patriot Group Establishes Early Meet, CHARLOlTE OBSERVER, Aug. 26, 1955, at SA; 
Southern Regional Council, Patriots of North Carolina, Inc. (1956) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with the North Carolina Collection, University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill)); NEIL R. 
McMILLEN, THE CITIZENS' CouNCIL: ORGANIZED RESISTANCE TO THE SECOND RECONSTRuc-
TioN, 1954-64, at 111 (1971). 
75. Here's An Insight Into Integrated Schools in N.C., RALEIGH NEWS AND OBSERVER, Apr. 
11, 1958, at 17; North Carolina Council on Human Relations, HuM. REL. BuLL. 6 (Mar. 1958) 
(on file with the Frederick Douglass Alexander Papers, Box 121-86, Special Collections, Atkins 
Library, University of North Carolina at Charlotte). 
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peared from the scene in North Carolina, the most short-lived of all 
southern segregationist organizations.76 
The Patriots failed because of the unwillingness of the state's ur-
ban areas to engage in a "resistance at all costs" response to desegre-
gation. Significantly, in Charlotte, unlike other parts of the state and 
other parts of the South, few business or professional persons of 
prominence ever associated with segregationist groups.77 White seg-
regationist organizations ran counter to the business sensibilities that 
dominated the city. The Patriots' leader in Charlotte, Kenneth Whit-
sett, a local artist, later complained that the leading business leaders in 
Charlotte refused to support his organization, fearing that such sup-
port would be bad for business.78 Whitsett noted that his organization 
never had more than thirty-five members in Mecklenburg County and 
that it ultimately wielded little influence.79 
The most strident reaction to the Charlotte School Board's deci-
sion came from outside the city. Shortly before the Charlotte schools 
opened, John Kasper, an itinerant New Jersey segregationist who trav-
eled the South inciting opposition to school desegregation, arrived in 
Charlotte from Clinton, Tennessee, where he had just served a six-
month jail sentence for interference with that city's school desegrega-
tion efforts.8° Kasper addressed a crowd of about 300 on the court-
house steps on Sunday, September 1, 1957, three days before the 
Charlotte schools were scheduled to open. Using inflammatory lan-
guage, Kasper urged the community to pressure the Board to reverse 
its decision to desegregate: "we want a heart attack, we want suicides, 
we want flight from persecution." He distributed leaflets featuring a 
photograph of a black man kissing a white woman and urged his white 
76. McMILLEN, supra note 74, at 111-12. Unlike resistance groups formed in other south-
ern states, the Patriots did not originate in the heavily agricultural "black belt" section of the 
state, but rather in the urban Piedmont. In time, the organization disbanded as the Piedmont 
cities came to understand the advantages of token desegregation. A second statewide segrega-
tionist organization, North Carolina Defenders of States Rights, Inc., never established a pres-
ence in Charlotte. Leach, supra note 23, at 21. 
77. Leach, supra note 23, at 13. Although a few Charlotteans were among the Patriots' 
founders, the organization was dominated by residents of Greensboro. McMILLEN, supra note 
74, at 111. 
78. Leach, supra note 23, at 14. 
79. I d. at 21. To be sure, a group of white parents did seek a school closing vote in accord-
ance with state law. The Charlotte School Board, however, refused to grant the election request 
and a state judge would not order it. Char/one Parents lnitiale Moves Aimed at Utilizing Pearsall 
Plan's Provisions, S. SCH. NEws, Aug. 1958, at 15. Charlotte's leadership was not prepared to 
allow the abandonment of the public schools over token desegregation. 
80. RICHARD A. PRIDE & DAVID J. WooDARD, THE BuRDEN OF BusiNG: THE Pouncs 
OF DESEGREGATION IN NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE 55-56 (1985). 
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followers to "load your shotguns."81 Yet Kasper's effect on Charlotte 
was minimal. He announced the formation of a Mecklenburg White 
Citizens' Council but could recruit only fifteen members; the organi-
zation disbanded within weeks. He encouraged a student strike and 
picketing of schools, but to no avail. 82 Kasper left Charlotte a few 
days later never to retum.s3 
In large measure, Kasper's failure to foster resistance to the to-
ken desegregation in Charlotte was due to his conflict with local sensi-
bilities. The majority of Charlotteans did not favor desegregation, but 
most were repelled by Kasper's extremist language and tactics. When 
Kasper first announced that he might come to Charlotte to stir up 
opposition to school integration, Whitsett, the leader of the segrega-
tionist Patriots, announced that any Patriot who had anything to do 
with Kasper would be "drummed out of the group. "84 The Charlotte 
Observer dismissed Kasper as a "hate-monger."85 
The initial desegregation of the Charlotte schools was relatively 
peaceful.86 This success, particularly in comparison with the simulta-
81. /d. at 56; Kasper Raps School Decision; Has Run-In With Littlejohn, CHARLOTTE OB-
SERVER, Sept. 2, 1957, at lB. 
82. White Citizens' Council Organized by Kasper, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Sept. 2, 1957, at 
lB. 
83. PRIDE & WooDARD, supra note 80, at 56; Kasper Free Momentarily, CHARLOTTE OB-
SERVER, Sept. 13, 1957, at 1A. 
84. Leach, supra note 23, at 18. 
85. Kasper Oil, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Sept. 5, 1957, at 1C. 
86. There was, however, one significant exception to the peaceful desegregation of the 
Charlotte schools. On Wednesday, September 4, the same day that nine black students made 
their first attempt to enroll at Central High School in Little Rock, Dorothy Counts enrolled at 
Harding High School in Charlotte. Several white students spit on Counts and threw sticks at 
her. Negro Girl is Jeered at Harding, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Sept. 5, 1957, at 1A. Police ulti-
mately arrested two students for disorderly conduct. Leach, supra note 23, at 22. The harass-
ment continued for the next several days and Counts eventually withdrew from Harding and 
enrolled in an integrated school in Philadelphia. Negro Girl Quits White High School, CHAR-
LOTrE OBSERVER, Sept. 13, 1957, at lA. 
Counts' experience received nationwide and even worldwide attention as photographs of 
her walking through the hostile crowd were transmitted throughout the world. Counts received 
hundreds of letters of support from across America and from more than a dozen foreign coun-
tries. North Carolina Council on Human Relations, HuM. REL. BULL. 3 (Oct. 1957) (citing arti-
cle on Counts in Lima, Peru newspaper) (on file with the Frederick Douglass Alexander Papers, 
Box 121-86, Special Collections, Atkins Library, University of North Carolina at Charlotte); 
BENJAMIN MusE, TEN YEARs oF PRELUDE: THE SToRY oF INTEGRATION SINCE THE SuPREME 
CouRT's 1954 DECISION 114-15 (1964); Telephone Interview with Darius Swann, in Atlanta, Ga. 
(Dec. 6, 1994); GAILLARD, supra note 64, at 8. 
Although the simultaneous and far more tumultuous integration of Central High School in 
Little Rock eventually overshadowed Counts' experience, the extensive publicity of Counts's 
ordeal had a profound impact on Charlotte and particularly on its leadership. A city jealous of 
its public image as a moderate southern city had been embarrassed before the world. Hence-
forth, having learned their lesson, the city's leaders would strive to avoid any negative publicity 
on racial matters. As one community leader later explained: .. There was a resolve it would 
never happen again." WATTERS, supra note 36, at 46. 
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neous and far more tumultuous school desegregation in Little Rock, 
another moderate southern city, was due primarily to the fact that no 
statewide or local leader, such as North Carolina Governor Luther 
Hodges, chose to exploit the issue for political advantage. More than 
any other southern governor of the 1950s, with the possible exception 
of Florida Governor LeRoy Collins, Hodges aggressively recruited 
new business to his state and sought to avoid any conduct that might 
discourage such activity.87 Hodges, like his southern counterparts, 
clearly favored segregation, but unlike governors such as Orval 
Faubus of Arkansas, he was unwilling to prevent token integration at 
the expense of a strong business climate.88 Hodges, joined by a signif-
icant number of state and localleaders,89 made the case for token de-
segregation as a means of avoiding judicial intervention in the 
operation of the schools and preserving the state's reputation for posi-
tive race relations. 
The desegregation of the Charlotte schools, although only token, 
was hailed as a success. In the fall of 1957, the Voice of America con-
trasted the Charlotte and Little Rock desegregation experiences, cit-
ing the Charlotte experience as illustrative of the nation's peaceful 
transition to an integrated society.90 Two years later, an Atlanta tele-
vision station made arrangements to film a documentary on school 
desegregation in Charlotte.9t 
During the next several years, a time when many southern cities 
reported downturns in business growth as a result of racial problems,92 
the Charlotte Chamber of Commerce reported generous increases in 
new business in the city.93 The comparison between Charlotte-along 
with the two other North Carolina cities to engage in token desegrega-
trl. COBB, supra note 11, at 123. 
88. Douglas, supra note 9, at 120-21. 
89. For example, in a widely-publicized speech to the North Carolina State Bar in Novem-
ber 1956, William Joyner, the vice-chair of the Pearsall Committee and a distinguished Raleigh 
attorney, noted that several other southern states had vowed never to admit a black child to a 
white school. According to Joyner, those states would eventually face either the abandonment 
of public education or court-mandated integration; neither option was acceptable. The Middle 
Road is Best, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, July 28, 1957, at 2B; 3 N.C. Cities Assign 12 Negroes to 
Previously All-White Schools, supra note 69, at 3. 
90. Marion Wright, Integration and Public Morals, 12 NEw SoUTH 7 (Nov. 1957) (on file 
with the North Carolina Collection, University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill)). 
91. Charlotte May Be Used as Integration Model, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Dec. 2, 1959, at 
8B. 
92. Business in Dixie: Many Southerners Say Racial Tension Slows Area's Economic Gains, 
WALL ST. J., May 26, 1961, at 1. 
93. Charlotte Chamber of Commerce, CHARLOTTE (Jan. 1962), (Jan. 1963), (Aug. 1963) (on 
file with the Frederick Douglass Alexander Papers, Box 114A-l, Special Collections, Atkins 
Library, University of North Carolina at Charlotte). 
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tion in 1957-and other southern communities that chose to resist in-
tegration is striking. For example, no new industrial plants located in 
Little Rock in 1958 and 1959 as a result of that city's tumultuous de-
segregation experience during the 1957-1958 school year. During the 
previous eight years, an average of five new plants had located annu-
ally in Little Rock bringing with them about 300 new jobs per year.94 
Preston Holmes, a Richmond banker, contrasted North Carolina's 
"moderation" with Arkansas's defiance in a 1959 article: "North Car-
olina, with legal compliance with the Supreme Court decision and lit-
tle social unrest, had new plant investment in 1958 totaling $253 
million, while Arkansas, with its massive resistance and unsettled con-
ditions, had only $25.4 million in 1958 compared with ... $131 million 
in 1956. "95 
But the initial desegregation of the Charlotte schools in 1957 was 
truly token. Having deflected possible court intervention through its 
preemptive desegregation, the Charlotte School Board assigned no 
additional black students to white schools in 1958 and approved only 
two out of 23 transfer requests filed by black students; only four black 
students attended a white school in Charlotte that year. In 1959, the 
Charlotte School Board denied every transfer request, continuing its 
policy of denying the transfer requests of black students who lived 
closer to their assigned black school than to the desired white school. 
Only one black student attended a white school in Charlotte during 
the 1959-1960 school year.96 In the meantime, the Mecklenburg 
County Board of Education continued to deny every request by a 
black student to attend a white school, notwithstanding NAACP-
sponsored litigation seeking to force the integration of an elementary 
school.97 Led by its business and professional leaders, Charlotte had 
94. ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, THE HIGH CosT OF CoNFUcr: A RoUNDUP OF OPINION 
FROM THE SoUTHERN BusiNESS CoMMUNITY oN THE ECONOMIC CoNSEQUENCES OF SCHOOL 
CLOSINGS AND VIOLENCE 11-12 (1963) (quoting NASHVILLE TENNESSEAN, May 31, 1959). 
95. Id. at 1. Similarly, Virginia, which adopted a statewide policy of massive resistance to 
the Brown decision, experienced a sharp decline in new business growth. During the first three 
years of the 1950s, Virginia added approximately 31,000 manufacturing jobs per year; during the 
last three years of the 1950s, after implementation of the state's widely publicized program of 
massive resistance, Virginia added approximately 5,000 new manufacturing jobs per year. Id. at 
8. 
96. Three Localities Begin Desegregation; Total Now Stands at Seven, S. ScH. NEws, Sept. 
1959, at 10. 
en. In February 1959, eight black students whose transfer requests in both 1957 and 1958 to 
a white elementary school had been denied, filed suit in federal district court against the Meck-
lenburg County School Board. The School Board had assigned the children to Torrence Lytle 
School, a black .. union" school in the county that educated children from grades one through 
twelve and that would be forced to close within a few years due to inadequate facilities. Each 
child lived about ten miles from Torrence Lytle and within walking distance of Derita Elemen-
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shrewdly captured national publicity as a pioneering southern city on 
race issues for the token integration of its schools in 1957 without any 
real commitment to school desegregation. The Charlotte-Mecklen-
burg Council on Human Relations chastised the Board in 1959 for its 
actions: "it seems increasingly clear that initial token desegregation, 
rather than paving the way for future compliance, is becoming a 
means of evasion of the law."98 
By 1960, Charlotte had demonstrated that it was prepared to en-
gage in token racial integration to avoid judicial intervention and to 
preserve control over the pace of desegregation. No litigation chal-
lenging racial discrimination in Charlotte would succeed until1969. In 
the context of the late 1950s, a handful of black children in white 
schools was all that was required to prevent litigation and to forge a 
reputation for racial moderation. By 1959, even though only one 
black child attended a desegregated school in the entire city, Charlotte 
was perceived throughout the country as a model of racial moderation 
and enjoyed the fruits of that reputation through the attraction of new 
business to the city. Token integration had permitted the city's lead-
ers to retain careful control over the process of integration by taking 
the issue away from the courts. Communities that failed to do like-
wise, such as New Orleans and Newport News, Virginia, found them-
tary, the white school to which the transfers were sought. Moreover, many of the white students 
assigned to Derita lived much further away from the school than did the black plaintiffs. Morrow 
v. Mecklenburg County Bd. of Educ., 195 F. Supp. 109, 111-12 (W.D.N.C. 1961). 
Federal Judge Wilson Warlick of Statesville ultimately considered the case at a hearing in 
Charlotte. Warlick concluded that he did not think the School Board had violated the 
Constitution: 
After a careful study of the evidence, the court is of the opinion that the defendant 
Board has conscientiously complied with the requirements placed upon it, and that the 
plaintiffs have failed to show wherein they were discriminated against because of their 
race. In their requests for reassignment, the plaintiffs all state as their reasons therefor 
that they lived closer to the Derita School than to the Torrence Lytle School, and that 
they desired a desegregated education. It has been defendant's position throughout 
that distance from a school has never been a determinative factor in the assignment of 
pupils because of the extensive use of busses throughout the State and the county .... 
/d. at 114 (emphasis supplied). Confronted with the delicate question of how it could justify 
requiring these black children to ride a bus twenty miles a day instead of walking to school solely 
because of their race, the School Board had argued that school busing had a long and distin-
guished history in North Carolina and that a child's physical proximity to a school was hardly 
decisive in terms of pupil assignment. Judge Warlick agreed, elaborating at great length on the 
extensive use of school busing throughout the state, noting that some North Carolina children 
rode buses 40-50 miles a day. /d. at 112. Warlick's decision was difficult to justify. The Board's 
initial assignment decisions were obviously race-based and hence unconstitutional. Neverthe-
less, the decision was indicative of the fact that the courts were not yet a receptive forum for 
black parents seeking to realize the promise of the Brown decision. 
98. Statement by Charlotte-Mecklenburg Council for Human Relations, School Board Must 
Move Toward Full Compliance, NEw SoUTH, 11 (Dec. 1959) (on file with North Carolina Collec-
tion, University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill)). 
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selves on the losing end of litigation that demanded far more 
extensive integration than Charlotte voluntarily embraced.99 
II. CHARLOTTE CoNFRONTS THE CrvrL RroHrs MovEMENT 
During the late 1950s and early 1960s, the dynamics of racial pro-
test in America changed, as black leaders increasingly turned to direct 
action as an alternative to litigation to challenge racial discrimination. 
Civil rights leaders in Charlotte embraced this new strategy. During 
the 1950s, the city's black community, led by the NAACP, had utilized 
petitions and an occasional lawsuit to encourage greater desegrega-
tion; during the early 1960s, however, the city's black leadership sup-
plemented this litigation strategy with public demonstrations as a 
means of pressuring the white community to yield to additional deseg-
regation demands. To a certain extent, this shift from petitions and 
litigation to public demonstrations reflected a diffusion of leadership 
in the black community away from the NAACP and toward other 
community groups.too 
Charlotte's white business leaders responded to this new pressure 
by drawing on the city's experience with token school desegregation 
in the 1950s: voluntary but token integration could fend off unwanted 
public demonstrations, control the pace of desegregation, and pre-
serve the city's progressive national image as a good place to live and 
do business. By 1963, Charlotte had once again received national ac-
claim for its integration efforts, this time for its restaurants and hotels. 
A. The Lunch Counter Sit-ins 
Since the 1940s, African Americans had conducted a handful of 
racial demonstrations in Charlotte. In the 1940s, a group of black 
protesters, led by a reporter from the Pittsburgh Courier, picketed the 
Charlotte Post Office to challenge the postal service's discriminatory 
employment practices. Similarly, in 1953, several black men sat down 
at the Dogwood Room at the Charlotte airport and demanded service; 
as a result, the restaurant began operating on a nondiscriminatory ba-
sis.101 Neither of these incidents, however, led to a sustained use of 
99. Adkins v. School Bd. of Newport News, 148 F. Supp. 430,446 (E.D. Va.), afj'd, 246 F.2d 
325 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855 (1957); Bush v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 138 F. Supp. 
337, 341 (E.D. La. 1956), aff'd, 242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 921 (1957). 
100. This shift has been recognized in communities throughout the South, as students and 
black clergy assumed a greater role as tactics broadened from litigation to include direct action. 
See DouG McADAM, POUTICAL PROCESS AND TIIE DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK INSURGENCY 
1930-1970, at 132-37 (1982). 
101. Interview with Reginald Hawkins, in Charlotte, N.C. (Oct. 12, 1992). 
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public demonstrations to challenge patterns of racial segregation in 
Charlotte. 
The first sustained demonstration challenging racial segregation 
in Charlotte began on February 9, 1960, when Charles Jones, a theo· 
logical student at Johnson C. Smith University, led a group of over 
one hundred students in a sit·in protest at several downtown Char· 
lotte lunch counters that refused service to black customers.102 The 
Charlotte sit·ins came on the heels of similar protests that had begun 
in Greensboro a few days earlier and which spread throughout the 
state and the South during February 1960. These sit·in protests helped 
change the dynamics of racial change in the American South. In the 
wake of the protests, black southerners began to challenge the racial 
status quo more aggressively. 
Jones would prove himself to be a savvy leader of the nascent 
protest movement. Though only twenty·two years old, Jones, the son 
of a Presbyterian minister father and an English professor mother, 
had considerable worldly experience. As a regional officer of the Na· 
tional Student Association, Jones traveled to the Vienna Youth Festi· 
val during the summer of 1959 where he extolled the benefits of 
American democracy to students from around the world. In early 
February 1960, Jones testified before the House Committee on Un· 
American Activities to counter an appearance by Paul Robeson, Jr. 
While driving home from Washington following his congressional ap· 
pearance, Jones heard a radio report describing the Greensboro sit·ins 
which began just a few days earlier. Moved by the courage of the 
Greensboro students, Jones decided to initiate similar action in Char· 
lotte. Jones, who was vice·president of the Smith student council, an· 
nounced at a council meeting his plan to conduct a sit·in the following 
day. The next morning, over two hundred Smith students joined him, 
sitting down and demanding service ·at the lunch counters in eight 
Charlotte stores.103 Each of these stores permitted black customers to 
take food away from the lunch counters to eat elsewhere but denied 
102. 7 Lunch Counters to Desegregate, CHARLOTfE OBSERVER, July 9, 1960, at lA. Johnson 
C. Smith University students would play an important role in much of the city's public demon-
stration activity over the course of the next several years. Located near downtown Charlotte, 
Smith had been established in the wake of the Civil War by the northern Presbyterian Church to 
educate black students. Although Smith did not have a tradition of civil rights activism as did, 
for example, Howard University, an increasing number of both students and faculty had become 
committed to pressing for racial change. Few racial demonstrations would take place in Char-
lotte during the early 1960s without a substantial contingent of Smith students. 
103. Telephone Interview with Charles Jones, in Charlotte, N.C. (Dec. 14, 1994); MARTIN 
OPPENHEIMER, THE SIT-IN MOVEMENT OF 1960, at 117-24 (1989). 
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them the opportunity to sit down and eat in the store.104 In the fol-
lowing days and weeks, the number of protesting students steadily in-
creased. Like the sit-ins in many other southern communities, the 
Charlotte protests were triggered by local students and were not part 
of a coherent and organized effort to spawn protest throughout the 
South.105 
The students enjoyed considerable support in the African-Ameri-
·can community. Although many blacks had been cautious about civil 
rights activism, the courage of the students attracted support through-
out the black community. Black professionals and business leaders 
organized a caravan of Cadillacs to transport the students from the 
Smith campus to the downtown stores. Black women who worked as 
domestics in the homes of prominent white families overheard conver-
sations at work concerning the sit-ins and reported them to Jones. 
Many African Americans wore old clothes at Easter church services in 
April1960 as a show of support.t06 
The students also enjoyed some support from the white commu-
nity. The Charlotte Observer backed the students in its editorial pages 
and helped apply pressure on the recalcitrant storeowners by publiciz-
ing the results of a survey that indicated that most Charlotteans would 
patronize a store that operated an integrated lunch counter.107 Many 
white shoppers canceled their credit cards at stores targeted by the 
protesters.108 In March, the Mecklenburg Christian Ministers Associ-
ation unanimously resolved for an end to racial discrimination in the 
city and county.1oo 
104. This refusal to permit black patrons to sit with their white counterparts was a well-
established part of the southern color line. A few stores in some upper South communities 
removed their lunch counter stools and permitted black patrons to stand and eat their lunch 
following the first several weeks of the sit-in protests. The Charlotte Observer commented: 
"some future logician will be baffled by an ancient logic that it was all right for a man to stand up 
and eat next to a person of another color but aU wrong to eat sitting next to him." Daniel H. 
Pollitt, Dime Store Demonstrations: Events and Legal Problems of First Sixty Days, 1960 DuKE 
L.J. 315, 322 n.43 (1960) (quoting CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Mar. 13, 1960, at 2). 
105. See OPPENHEIMER, supra note 103, at 121; Paul E. Wehr, The Sit-Down Protests: A 
Study of Passive Resistance in North Carolina (1960) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of 
North Carolina (Chapel Hill)). 
106. Telephone Interview with Charles Jones, supra note 103. Not everyone in the black 
community, however, endorsed the sit-in protests. Black minister Nathaniel Tross sharply criti-
cized the students for their actions. The students responded by hanging Tross in effigy on the 
Smith campus. ld.; OPPENHEIMER, supra note 103, at 119. 
107. OPPENHEIMER, supra note 103, at 120. 
108. Telephone Interview with Sidney Freeman, in Charlotte, N.C. (Dec. 15, 1994). 
109. Ministers; Racial Fight Must End, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Mar. 16, 1960, at lB. One 
white minister, Sidney Freeman of the Unitarian Church of Charlotte, joined the student demon-
strators. Freeman taught English and speech classes at Johnson C. Smith University; several of 
the student protesters were his students and solicited his involvement in the sit-ins. Freeman, an 
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Jones carefully distanced his group of demonstrators from na-
tional civil rights organizations such as the Congress of Racial Equal-
ity, which had identified with the sit-in movement in other cities. 
Anxious to defuse the typical white view that racial unrest was the 
result of "outside agitators," Jones emphasized that all his group 
wanted was to "sit down and eat" when they were tired.11o 
Mayor James Smith and Chamber of Commerce president Stan-
ford Brookshire met in February 1960 to discuss the potential impact 
of the protests on Charlotte's image and business climate. Smith was 
entering his last year as mayor; Brookshire would take his place in the 
mayor's office in 1961, a position he would hold until 1969. During 
those eight years, Brookshire would emerge as one of the central 
figures in Charlotte's desegregation efforts.111 Prior to entering public 
life, Brookshire said very little about issues of racial discrimination 
and did not enjoy significant black support in his first election bid. 
During the course of his tenure as mayor, however, Brookshire would 
become increasingly outspoken about the evils of racial discrimina-
tion, characterizing it as both immoral and bad for business. On sev-
eral occasions, Brookshire would request the city and his fellow 
business owners to hire more black workers.112 Indeed, Brookshire 
was one of the first Charlotte business leaders to favor non-discrimi-
natory hiring, and promoted such action at the Chamber of Com-
merce board meetings in the 1950s.113 To Brookshire, expanding job 
opportunities made good economic sense; in his view, many of Char-
lotte's black citizens were an "economic liability" to the city and in-
affable Wisconsin native who had come to Charlotte in 1957, would become a familiar white face 
in racial demonstrations throughout the early 1960s. Telephone Interview with Sidney Freeman, 
supra note 108; Pastor-Activist Saw Some Tumultuous Times, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Jan. 29, 
1989, at lB. 
110. OPPENHEIMER, supra note 103, at 121; Telephone Interview with Charles Jones, supra 
note 103. Jones would later identify with national civil rights efforts, however, becoming a leader 
in the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee. Id. 
111. Brookshire, a native of Troutman, just north of Charlotte, had moved to the city in the 
late 1920s after graduating from Duke University. Brookshire would eventually become presi-
dent of his own business, Engineering Sales Company, and for much of the 1950s and 1960s 
functioned as perhaps the city's leading business, civic, and political leader. In addition to serv-
ing as president of the Chamber of Commerce and mayor, Brookshire headed the city's United 
Appeal and chaired the board of one of the city's most prominent churches, Myers Park Meth-
odist. Stanford Brookshire, Brookshire Lives (1980) (on file with the Stanford Brookshire Pa-
pers, Special Collections, Atkins Library, University of North Carolina at Charlotte). 
112. See, e.g., Mayor Asks Businessmen to Open Jobs to Negroes, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, 
Jan. 7,1963, at 7A; Mayor: City Has Duty to Negroes, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Oct. 10, 1962, at 
1E. 
113. WATTERS, supra note 36, at 7. 
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creased employment would enable them to make a stronger 
contribution to the economic health of the community.114 
Brookshire and Mayor Smith agreed on the need for the mayor's 
office to take a prominent role in the resolution of the sit-ins. Within 
several weeks, Smith announced the establishment of a bi-racial com-
munity organization, known as the Mayor's Committee on Friendly 
Relations, devoted to improving race relations. Both Smith and 
Brookshire perceived significant advantages to be gained from taking 
preemptive action to control the demonstrations. Brookshire in par-
ticular relied quite heavily on this bi-racial committee during his ten-
ure as mayor to resolve racial disputes out of the public eye. Public 
demonstrations, Brookshire believed, "set up tensions and create ill-
will which ... retard progress."115 Negotiating racial conflict in pri-
vate committee meetings permitted the city's white leadership to re-
tain tight control over the pace of integration without any significant 
damage to the city's carefully nurtured moderate image. 
The Mayor's Committee managed to secure a hiatus in the sit-ins 
while it attempted to negotiate a settlement with the merchants. In 
June, when the negotiations bore no fruit, the students resumed their 
protests, coupled with a boycott of the entire downtown business area 
that won broad support among black customers.116 A threatened July 
4 demonstration proved decisive. The owners of the targeted busi-
nesses requested a meeting with the Mayor's Committee that resulted 
in a settlement providing for integrated lunch counters. On July 9, 
black students were served at seven Charlotte lunch counters for the 
first time; by agreement, the local newspapers did not report the de-
segregation until after the fact to avoid conflict.117 Charlotte thereby 
became one of the first southern communities to integrate its lunch 
counters.118 
114. Letter from Stanford Brookshire to J.K. Clontz (Feb. 14, 1963) (on file with the Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg Community Relations Committee Papers, Box 1-5, Special Collections, At-
kins Library, University of North Carolina at Charlotte). 
115. Stanford Brookshire, Unpublished Address (1961) (transcript available with the Stan-
ford Brookshire Papers, Box 26-4, Special Collections, Atkins Library, University of North Car-
olina at Charlotte). 
116. Stanford Brookshire, Charlotte's Response to the Civil Rights Movement (Jan. 22, 
1979) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Stanford Brookshire Papers, Box 36-1, Stanford 
Brookshire Papers, Special Collections, Atkins Library, University of North Carolina at Char-
lotte); OPPENHEIMER, supra note 103, at 118-22; Lunch Counter Protests Resumed, CHARLOTTE 
OBSERVER, June 28, 1960, at lB. 
117. OPPENHEIMER, supra note 103, at 122. 
118. Not only did Charlotte desegregate its lunch counters sooner than did most other cities, 
there were also fewer arrests in Charlotte. OPPENHEIMER, supra note 103, at 91-93. 
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The success of the sit-ins flowed in large measure from their per-
ceived and actual economic disruption. The students ability to sustain 
their protests and to threaten the business climate of the city caused 
the merchants to relent. Chamber of Commerce president Brookshire 
later conceded that the city's business leadership evaluated the deseg-
regation issue in economic terms: "[i]t seems odd now that Mayor 
Smith and I and, I think, the rest of the white community throughout 
the South, were overlooking both the legal and moral aspects of the 
problem"119-focusing instead on the economic impact of the pro-
tests. Brookshire later noted: "The Chamber was aware of and con-
cerned about the boycotts and disruption of business in [other cities], 
apprehensive that Charlotte might suffer in a like manner unless the 
protest movement could be contained here. "120 The Charlotte Ob-
server saw it the same way: "Charlotte merchants have now made 
their decision after full consideration of both their economic and 
moral position. "121 The ability of the students to apply economic 
pressure on the merchants proved decisive.t22 
Charlotte was not the only southern city to integrate its lunch 
counters in response to the sit-ins of 1960. By August, over twenty-
five upper South cities-in North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Vir-
ginia-had opened some public lunch counters on a non-racial basis. 
Lunch counter protests in deep South states failed, however, as 
merchants in those communities proved more willing to withstand 
economic pressure.123 
The sit-ins during the spring of 1960 unleashed several years of 
direct action protest throughout the South, a supplement to much of 
the litigation-orientation of earlier civil rights activity. In some mea-
sure, the courts' weak enforcement of Brown signaled that direct ac-
tion would be required to force racial change. The NAACP would 
continue its desegregation litigation with increasing success, but with 
the sit-ins of the spring of 1960, the dynamics of racial protest in the 
American South had shifted. In cities like Charlotte, which were 
acutely aware of their national image on racial issues and the eco-
119. Brookshire, supra note 116, at 5. 
120. /d. 
121. The Merchants Have Made the Only Possible Decision, CHARLOITE OBSERVER, July 10, 
1960, at 2E. 
122. The success of the student protests may also have been influenced by the growing polit· 
ical strength of the black community. In May 1960, during the sit-in protests, political moderate 
Terry Sanford defeated segregationist Beverly Lake in the Democratic primary for Governor of 
North Carolina; it was widely understood that black voters had provided important support for 
Sanford. OPPENHEIMER, supra note 103, at 124. 
123. /d. at 179-80. 
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nomic consequences of a reputation for poor race relations, demon-
strations would be highly successful at forcing city leaders to take 
action. 
B. The Irwin Avenue School Boycott 
During August 1961, public demonstrations erupted over a sepa-
rate issue: school segregation. In April of that year, the Charlotte-
Mecklenburg School Board had decided to convert white high school, 
Harding, into an all-black junior high school, renaming it Irwin Ave-
nue Junior High School. As part of the conversion, the Board trans-
ferred all of the white students and faculty at Harding High School to 
a newly constructed building and then moved over 800 African-Amer-
ican students and teachers from Northwest Junior High School to Ir-
win Avenue. The new Harding High School was slated to operate as 
an all-white school whereas Irwin Avenue would educate only black 
students. Although traditionally a white school, old Harding High 
School, located near the downtown area of the city, was the closest 
school to a number of black residential areas. Over the years, a 
number of nearby black students had sought transfers to the white 
school. Although the School Board denied most of these requests, 
pressure to desegregate Harding High School increased in light of its 
proximity to black neighborhoods.124 
The School Board's actions engendered protest in both the black 
and white communities. About 150 white parents, who lived in neigh-
borhoods close to Harding, petitioned the School Board to make Har-
ding available to both white and black children at the junior high 
level, although requiring black children to pass an entrance examina-
tion before being admitted. The unexpected white push for a neigh-
borhood desegregated school was motivated largely by economic 
considerations. The decision to change Harding from a white to a 
black school caused a drop in property values in white neighborhoods 
near the school; white residents believed that it was better to have a 
neighborhood desegregated school than a neighborhood black 
school.125 
At the same time, a group of black parents, calling themselves the 
Westside Parents Council, under the leadership of Dr. Reginald Haw-
kins, a local dentist and Presbyterian minister, complained that the 
124. NAACP Leader Criticizes Use of Placement Act, S. SCH. NEWS, May 1961, at 9. 
125. /d.; Negro, White Delegation Air Views on New School, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Apr. 
18, 1961, at lB. 
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white students from old Harding were being provided a new school, 
leaving the black students with an old school. They asked the School 
Board to operate old Harding High School as an integrated facility. 126 
During the early 1960s, Hawkins emerged as the leading black 
activist in Charlotte. Born in Beaufort, North Carolina, Hawkins had 
been educated at Johnson C. Smith University, where he 
quarterbacked the football team, and at Howard University's dental 
school. Hawkins' years at Howard were particularly significant, as he 
was exposed to a community that took seriously the need to challenge 
the discriminatory treatment of African Americans. Hawkins spent 
the early 1950s in the army, during which time he developed an aware-
ness of the potential of organized religion to influence the political 
d~velopment of black Americans. One of Hawkins' army colleagues, 
a Jewish psychologist, spent much time explaining to Hawkins the sig-
nificance of religion in the political and social development of the Jew-
ish people. Upon leaving the army in 1953, Hawkins returned to 
Charlotte to open a dental practice and to enroll in the theological 
seminary at Johnson C. Smith. Upon completing his theological de-
gree, Hawkins did not enter the fulltime pastorate-choosing instead 
to maintain his dental practice-but did begin a long history of close 
work with the United Presbyterian Church around issues of racial 
discrimina tion.127 
In 1959, Hawkins organized his own political group-the Meck-
lenburg Organization on Political Affairs (MOPA).128 Consistent with 
the actions of black activists in many other southern communities, 
Hawkins did not affiliate his new organization with any national civil 
rights organization.t29 Although MOPA initially focused its attention 
on increasing black voter registration, in the early 1960s, the organiza-
tion began to challenge various aspects of racial segregation in the 
city-particularly in the schools and hospitals-through public dem-
onstrations. At the same time, Hawkins established close contacts 
with both the Sanford Administration in Raleigh and the Kennedy 
Administration in Washington which enabled him to supplement his 
public demonstrations against segregation with governmental pres-
126. NAACP Leader Criticizes Use of Placement Act, supra note 124, at 9. 
127. Interview with Reginald Hawkins, supra note 101; Gregory Davis, A Multi-Disciplinary 
Critique of the Protest-Accomodationist Analysis of the Black Church and Black Leadership 
Syles with an Analysis of the Leadership Styles of Dr. Reginald Armistice Hawkins 86-89 (1985) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Union Graduate School). 
128. Local Negro Political Group Forms, CHARLOITE OBSERVER, Apr. 23, 1959. 
129. Carson, supra note 5, at 24. 
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sure.13° In time, Hawkins would alienate much of the city's white 
power structure. Moreover, many blacks while respecting Hawkins' 
courage to take on the white establishment, kept their distance from 
Hawkins because of his outspoken nature.13 1 Unquestionably, how-
ever, Hawkins' confrontational actions profoundly influenced the 
pace of racial desegregation in Charlotte. 
During the summer of 1961, Hawkins argued that the School 
Board, in converting Harding High School from a white to a black 
school and providing a new school for the Harding white students, was 
simply continuing its practice of closing certain white schools that 
were under pressure to admit neighboring black students and replac-
ing those closed schools with newly constructed ones in distant white 
neighborhoods. Hawkins had a legitimate point. Earlier, the Board 
had closed a white high school and junior high school that had deseg-
regated in 1957 and that were located near a significant black popula-
tion and built in their stead new schools in white neighborhoods. At 
the elementary school level, the Board converted three schools from 
white to black in response to changing neighborhoods.132 Hawkins 
complained at the time: "when a neighborhood begins to desegregate 
and its Negro residents become eligible under the Pupil Assignment 
Act to apply for admission to an all-white school, the school is aban-
doned, moved somewhere else, to suburbia."133 
To publicize his complaints, Hawkins organized a student boycott 
of the newly-named Irwin Avenue Junior High School. When the 
school opened on the morning of August 30, 1961, picketers greeted 
the arriving African-American students, urging them to return to 
Northwest Junior High, their previous school. Hawkins marched at 
the head of the line, carrying a sign that read "Desegregate on a Geo-
graphical Basis." The boycott won broad support; approximately 500 
of the 800 students assigned to Irwin returned to their old school-
Northwest-and attempted to enroll.. When they were denied admis-
130. Ultimately Hawkins would run for Governor of North Carolina in both 1968 and 1972. 
Ironically, Martin Luther King was assassinated in April 1968 when he postponed a campaign 
appearance with Hawkins to remain in Memphis in support of a sanitation strike. King May 
- Postpone NC Tour with Hawkins, CHARLOITE OBSERVER, Apr. 2, 1968, at 1C; Interview with 
Reginald Hawkins, supra note 101; Davis, supra note 127, at 95-100. 
131. Interview with Raymond Worsley in Charlotte, N.C. (Oct. 15, 1992). 
132. Only 300 Attend Irwin First Day, CHARLOITE OBSERVER, Sept. 1, 1961, at 18; School-
Boycott Leaders Seek More Public Support, CHARLOTIE OBSERVER, Sept. 8, 1961, at 4A. 
133. School Unit Told it is Evading Desegregation Opportunities, CHARLOTIE OBSERVER, 
Apr. 19, 1961, at 1A. 
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sion to Northwest, a number of the students simply stayed home from 
school.134 
Hawkins understood that to be successful, he needed to gain the 
attention of the city's white business leaders. Charlotte was scheduled 
to host the North Carolina World Trade Fair in October 1961 and 
Hawkins announced plans to use the Fair to publicize the city's dis-
criminatory practices. Hawkins told a newspaper reporter that he 
planned to write letters to President John Kennedy and the presidents 
of Mexico and Finland, each of whom might attend the Trade Fair, 
explaining his protest and telling them that all was "not fair in Char-
lotte." Hawkins conceded that the city's white business leadership 
had warned him against causing the city "embarrassment during the 
Trade Fair," but he made it clear that he would ignore those warnings: 
"what do they know of embarrassment? We have been embarrassed 
all our lives. "135 
Confronted with the ugly specter of an ongoing school boycott 
and potential disruption and embarrassment in connection with the 
Trade Fair, school board chair David Harris agreed to meet with Haw-
kins. At the same time, Brookshire's Mayor's Committee on Commu-
nity Relations136 passed a resolution urging an end to the boycott and 
authorizing the appointment of a permanent subcommittee on educa-
tion to assist with racial problems in the public schools. In the 
meantime, the School Board announced plans to build a new junior 
high school that would operate on an integrated basis. Following 
these actions, Hawkins called off the boycott.137 
Although the boycott was ostensibly a failure because the trans-
formation of Harding from a white high school to a black junior high 
was not rescinded, it increased pressure on the Charlotte-Mecklen-
burg School Board to eliminate race-based assignment practices. In 
response to Hawkins' complaints about race-based pupil assignments, 
during the summer of 1962 the Board adopted a limited geographic 
assignment scheme pursuant to which pupils of both races would for 
the first time be assigned to the same school.138 Eight years after the 
134. Only 300 Attend Irwin First Day, supra note 132, at lB. 
135. Hawkins Heaps Abuse on School Officials, CHARLOTI'E OBSERVER, Sept. 4, 1961, at lC. 
136. Brookshire's Mayor's Committee on Community Relations was the successor to Mayor 
Smith's earlier Mayor's Committee on Friendly Relations. 
137. Negroes Call Off School Boycott, CHARLO'ITE OBSERVER, Sept. 14, 1961, at 1B; UNITED 
STATES CoMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 69, at 87-88. Hawkins was subsequently ap-
pointed to the new subcommittee on education. Id. 
138. Following a pattern it had established with the initial desegregation in 1957, the Board 
consulted with the editors of the Charlotte Observer and the Charlotte News as well as represent-
atives of local television stations in order to get a sense of the community's willingness to accept 
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Brown v. Board of Education decision, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
School Board became one of the first school boards in the South to 
assign a few children to school on some basis other than their race.139 
During the 1962-1963 school year, 41 of the school system's 18,596 
black students attended a majority white school; although only a frac-
tion of the total black student population, that number was roughly 
equal to the total number of black students who had ever attended a 
white school in Charlotte.140 
The Charlotte-Mecklenburg School Board converted to a limited 
geographic attendance plan in 1962 in response to Hawkins' pressure 
and because of its concern that the courts would order more extensive 
desegregation if the Board failed to act voluntarily. Although the 
Board had successfully defended a suit challenging its failure to allow 
a few black students to transfer to a white school in 1961,141 the Board 
recognized that the courts would eventually demand greater desegre-
gation. Paul Ervin, one of the Board's attorneys, advised Board mem-
bers that they could not continue to expect the federal courts to 
uphold race-based pupil assignments and that the Board would 
ultimately have to abandon such assignments to satisfy judicial 
requirements.142 
further desegregation. UNITED STATES CoMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGJITS, supra note 69, at 89. 
Again following the 1957 pattern, the media representatives agreed not to report the Board's 
deliberations on the desegregation issue. Ultimately, the Board voted to try geographic pupil 
assignments on a limited basis for the 1962-63 school year. Charlotte Changes Placement Policy; 
More Negroes Assigned, S. SCH. NEws, June 1962, at 7. 
139. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 69, at 86. The Chapel Hill, 
North Carolina, school system a year earlier had become the first school system in the South to 
make all pupil assignments based solely on geography. Charlotte Changes Placement Policy; 
More Negroes Assigned, supra note 138, at 7. 
140. UNITED STATES CoMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 69, at 50. 
141. Morrow v. Mecklenburg County Bd. of Educ., 195 F. Supp. 109 (W.D.N.C. 1961). 
142. Paul Ervin, A National Day of Mourning (June 9, 1968) (unpublished speech in posses-
sion of author); Telephone Interview with Paul Ervin, Jr., in Atlanta, GA (Jan. 25, 1992). Ervin's 
advice was a correct read of the law. In September 1960, a federal court had ordered the Yancey 
County School Board in western North Carolina to allow African Americans to attend a white 
high school, since the Board did not operate a black high school. Griffith v. Board of Educ. of 
Yancey County, 186 F. Supp. 511 (W.D.N.C. 1960). In August 1961, another federal judge or-
dered the admission of an African-American student to a white school in Chapel Hill, finding 
that he had been excluded from that school in favor of a black school solely because of his race. 
Vickers v. Chapel Hill City Bd. of Educ., 196 F. Supp. 97 (M.D.N.C. 1961). It was the first such 
decision in the state's history. One year later, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit found that the Durham School Board had unconstitutionally assigned African-American 
students to black schools because of their race and ordered the Board to cease its discriminatory 
practices. Wheeler v. Durham City Bd. of Educ., 309 F.2d 630, 633 (4th Cir. 1962). With these 
decisions, the school desegregation jurisprudence in North Carolina had shifted. The courts 
were no longer dismissing desegregation challenges on the grounds that administrative remedies 
had not been exhausted or that school boards had acted within their discretion. Now, the courts 
were paying closer attention to the realities of school board actions and were prepared to strike 
down race-based assignment plans. 
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At the same time, the African-American community had stepped 
up its demand for integrated schools. In May 1961, three months 
before the boycott of old Harding High School, NAACP national 
legal counsel Thurgood Marshall visited North Carolina and told a 
statewide NAACP rally that it was time for a massive assault by the 
black community on segregated education in North Carolina.143 Im-
mediately thereafter, the Charlotte chapter of the organization initi-
ated an intensive campaign to persuade black parents to seek transfers 
for their children to white schools. In response, the Charlotte-Meck-
lenburg School Board granted more transfer requests that summer-
26-than ever before; one year earlier, the Board had granted only 
one transfer request.144 Over the course of the next few years, the 
demands of black Charlotteans for integrated schools would dramati-
cally increase. 
In the early 1960s, the black community in Charlotte effectively 
employed two convergent strategies to gain greater school desegrega-
tion: litigation and direct action protest. Certain local NAACP lead-
ers favored litigation; Hawkins, on the other hand, recognized that 
litigation alone would be too slow and that direct action should be 
used in addition to lawsuits. When Hawkins first threatened the 
school boycott in the summer of 1961, NAACP leader Kelly Alexan-
der criticized him, commenting that the black students in question 
should request transfers and exhaust their administrative remedies as 
a prelude to litigation. According to Alexander, Hawkins was "steer-
ing his own course, and it is not one charted by the NAACP."145 
Hawkins, however, perceived the need to do more than file lawsuits, 
given the lack of success of previous litigation efforts.146 "We feel that 
this matter has gone beyond the courts," Hawkins explained. "The 
city and state can keep cases like this in the courts for ten years," and 
"we haven't got ten years."147 
143. Thurgood Marshall Calls for Broader Desegregation Drive, S. SCH. NEws, June 1961, at 
5. At the time of Marshall's address, fewer than one hundred black students attended white 
schools in North Carolina. /d. 
144. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 69, at 86. 
145. NAACP, Schools Vie on Harding, CHARLOTTE NEWS, Aug. 2, 1961, at 1C. 
146. Nevertheless, Hawkins filed several lawsuits in the early 1960s challenging racial dis· 
crimination with the assistance of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund's national office. For exam-
ple, Hawkins filed a successful lawsuit desegregating the North Carolina Dental Society. 
Hawkins v. North Carolina Dental Soc'y, 355 F.2d 718 (4th Cir. 1966). He also sued the Meck-
lenburg County Hospital Authority and the local YMCA, claiming unlawful racial segregation. 
See infra text ·accompanying notes 159 & 223. 
147. 'Old Harding' Fight to Start, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Aug. 16, 1961, at 1B; Interview 
with Reginald Hawkins, supra note 101. 
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C. Desegregating the City's Hospitals 
In the meantime, Hawkins expanded his focus by challenging the 
city's segregated hospitals. During the 1950s, the only hospital in the 
city that would admit black patients was Good Samaritan, an inade-
quate facility that had been established by the Episcopal Church in 
the late nineteenth century.148 A study in the 1950s by United Com-
munity Services concluded that efforts to modernize Good Samaritan 
would be futile; at the same time, the Charlotte Observer ran a series 
of stories detailing the inadequacies of Good Samaritan.149 Yet 
neither Memorial Hospital, the publicly owned facility, nor two other 
privately owned hospitals founded by religious organizations-Pres-
byterian Hospital and Mercy (Catholic) Hospital-admitted black 
patients. 
In response to complaints about the poor condition of Good Sa-
maritan, the Charlotte Hospital Authority proposed in early 1960 the 
issuance of $800,000 in bonds to renovate the hospital. The Charlotte 
Medical Society, an organization of black health care professionals 
under the leadership of Hawkins, opposed the bond issuance, request-
ing instead that black patients be admitted to Memorial Hospital, and 
threatened litigation if Memorial failed to act.150 Memorial Hospital 
appeared divided over the desegregation issue. The director of the 
city's Hospital Authority, Rush Dickson, who was responsible for the 
operation of Memorial, claimed that the hospital did not have ade-
These disagreements between Hawkins and Alexander would continue. In 1963, Hawkins' 
political organization, MOPA, threatened to withhold support for a school bond issue unless the 
School Board adopted a far more ambitious desegregation plan. Alexander disagreed with 
Hawkins, explaining that "the need for expanding educational programs and facilities for the 
total community is so great that the matter of desegregation should not be used to hobble an 
educational bond issue at this time." First Job of Both Races: To Retain Public Schools, CHAR-
LOlTE OBSERVER, Nov. 14, 1963, at 2B. See also Hawkins' Group Asks School Board for Inte-
gration Plan, CHARLOlTE OBSERVER, Nov. 13, 1963, at 7 A; School Bonds Get Support of 
NAACP, CHARL01TE OBSERVER, Nov. 13,1963, at 7A; Negroes: Desegregate Now, CHARLOTTE 
NEws, Nov. 12, 1963, at lB. 
Once agin, Alexander announced that the NAACP preferred to pursue its desegregation 
goals through a legal challenge to the School Board's assignment system. School Bonds Get 
Suppon of NAACP, supra. Hawkins would remain a member of the NAACP and would per-
form an active role in much of the organization's litigation efforts of the 1960s, including the 
challenge to segregated schools, but he would retain certain differences with Alexander over 
appropriate strategy. 
148. Leach, supra note 23, at 128-29. 
149. Memorial Hosptial Bond Issue Vital, CHARLOTIE OBSERVER, May 5, 1957, at 1C; Hos-
pital Need Overshadows Attempt to Confuse Issue, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, May 7, 1957, at 2B; 
Leach, supra note 23, at 129. 
150. Negro Doctors Want Hospitals Desegregated, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, July 18, 1961, at 
SA. 
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quate facilities to treat both white and black patients.151 The hospi-
tal's medical staff, however, opposed efforts to renovate Good 
Samaritan and urged that Memorial operate on a desegregated basis. 
Dickson rebuked the staff, noting that it was the hospital board and 
administrators-not the medical staff-that were charged with the re-
sponsibility for operating the hospital.152 Ultimately, however, Me-
morial agreed to set aside a small percentage of its beds, all located on 
one floor of the hospital, for black patients.153 
Subsequently, in 1962, Hawkins increased pressure on Memorial 
to admit additional black patients by announcing that he would com-
mence public demonstrations outside Memorial Hospital unless it 
fully desegregated its facilities. In response to the threat of demon-
strations, Memorial agreed to open an additional twenty beds to black 
patients. Hawkins rejected the hospital's compromise gesture: "This 
appeasement by allocation of Negro beds isn't the answer. They don't 
show good faith by continuing segregation."154 In late February 1962, 
Hawkins initiated public demonstrations protesting racially exclusion-
ary policies at all four of the city's hospitals, including Good Samari-
tan, since none of the four operated on a fully desegregated basis.155 
Brookshire, who had moved to the mayor's office in 1961, at-
tacked Hawkins. Brookshire issued a statement in March 1962 that 
accused Hawkins of destroying the city's climate of good race 
relations: 
These belligerent acts of pressure will result in building resentments 
and antagonisms. Such acts tend to destroy the good will so neces-
sary to any progress which this community has been working to es-
tablish. For these reasons I regret that the students and their 
leaders have resorted to coercion, instead of lending their support 
and cooperation to the community leadership, both white and Ne-
151. Dickson Syas Memorial Can't Admit Negroes, CHARLOTIE OBSERVER, Oct. 20, 1959, at 
1B; Leach, supra note 23, at 131-32. 
152. Doctors Stymie Samaritan Project, CHARLOTIE OBSERVER, Mar. 17,1960, at 1C; Reso-
lutions Criticized by Dickson, CHARLOTIE OBSERVER, Mar. 17, 1960, at 1C. 
153. Edward C. Halperin, Special Repon: Desegregation of Hospitals and Medical Societies in 
North Carolina, 318 NEw ENG. J. MED. 58, 61 (1988). 
154. Negro Patients Get Additional Beds, CHARLOTIE OBSERVER, Feb. 21, 1962, at 1B; 
Leach, supra note 23, at 136. 
155. When Good Samaritan finally admitted its first white patient, Hawkins called off the 
picketing there. In time, the picketers won some white support, primarily that of Sidney Free-
man, pastor of the Charlotte Unitarian Church who had been involved in the lunch counter 
demonstrations in 1960. 4 Whites Aid Negro Picketers, CHARLOTIE OBSERVER, Mar. 11, 1962, at 
6A. 
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gro, which seeks peaceful solutions to these problems through con· 
structive efforts.1~6 
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Brookshire attempted to isolate Hawkins as a radical, claiming that 
his actions did "not meet with the general approval of the masses or 
leaders of either race in Charlotte."157 Hoping to contain the demon-
strations, Brookshire attacked Hawkins for taking his grievances to 
the streets rather than to the Mayor's Community Relations 
Committee: 
Furthermore, these actions are in violation of agreements expressed 
by the leaders involved, who had previously agreed before witnesses 
to work through the Mayor's ... Committee. I am convinced that 
this strong biracial committee, composed of leaders of both races, 
can do more in a quiet way that any biased group can do by ex-
ploitation and/or public exhibitions. ISs 
Hawkins understood, however, that engaging the white elite in the 
public square would be far more effective than doing so in a private 
conference room. Consequently, Hawkins refused to back down. 
When the demonstrations had little immediate impact, Hawkins 
initiated other actions to force the full integration of the city's hospi-
tals. First, with the assistance of NAACP Legal Defense Fund attor· 
neys, he filed suit seeking an injunction to prevent the city's Hospital 
Authority from spending additional funds to renovate Good Samari-
tan.159 Second, he contacted both United States Attorney General 
Robert Kennedy and the federal Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare to complain about the discrimination at Memorial in the 
admission of black patients.160 Hawkins' complaint triggered a federal 
investigation of the hospital; the investigators eventually concluded 
that the hospital did discriminate on the basis of race in its maternity 
and dental clinics.l61 One year later, in 1963, Memorial Hospital 
agreed to operate on a fully desegregated basis. Hawkins' combina-
tion of both demonstrations and threatened litigation--coupled with 
federal pressure-had again forced racial change in Charlotte. By re-
fusing Brookshire's offer to go immediately to negotiation, Hawkins 
156. Brookshire Says He Regrets Pickets' Use of 'Coercion', CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Mar. 4, 
1962, at 16C. 
157. /d. 
158. /d. 
159. Injunction is Sought on Rebuilding Funds, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, July 24, 1962, at lB. 
160. Probe of Hospital 'Collusion' Asked, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, June 23, 1962, at 3A; Me-
morial Hospital About to Get Second U.S. Investigation, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Aug. 11, 1962, 
at lB. 
161. Discrimination May Be Cited at Memorial, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Aug. 16, 1962, at 
lD; Halperin, supra note 153, at 61. 
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challenged white control over the desegregation process and greatly 
enhanced his prospects for success. 
D. Desegregating Charlotte's Public Accommodations 
Hawkins enjoyed his greatest success when he forced the desegre-
gation of Charlotte's public accommodations. These desegregation ef-
forts placed Charlotte in the national spotlight and helped define the 
city's race relations for the rest of the decade. 
Following the sit-ins of 1960, Johnson C. Smith University stu-
dents engaged in a few sporadic demonstrations in 1961 and 1962 to 
challenge the exclusion of black patrons from local restaurants, but 
had limited success. Mayor Brookshire had again intervened, helping 
to persuade two department stores to desegregate their restaurants in 
exchange for a promise from the students to bring future racial com-
plaints to the Mayor's Community Relations Committee before 
resorting to public demonstrations.162 
During the spring of 1963, civil rights marches protesting discrim-
ination in public accommodations spread throughout the South, in-
cluding a number of North Carolina cities. No marches were held in 
Charlotte during the first several months of 1963, but Hawkins an-
nounced that he would lead such protests if the city's restaurants and 
hotels persisted in their failure to serve black patrons.163 Charlotte 
again planned to host the North Carolina World Trade Fair during 
April 1963. Recognizing the importance of the Trade Fair to the city's 
local economy, Charlotte's business leaders sought to avoid any con-
troversy surrounding the Trade Fair, as they had in 1961.164 City lead-
ers well understood that protests and confrontation during that week 
would sully the city's business reputation. Moreover, Martin Luther 
King was scheduled to speak in late May at the graduation exercises 
of the city's six black high schools, bringing a national spotlight to the 
city on racial issues.16s 
Shortly before the opening of the Trade Fair and in the face of 
threatened demonstrations by Hawkins, Brookshire's Mayor's Com-
munity Relations Committee announced that several of the city's ho-
162. Chamber Action Significant One, CHARLO'ITE OBSERVER, May 28, 1963, at 1A; NoRTH 
CAROUNA AND THE NEGRO 52-53 {Capus M. Waynick et at. eds., 1964); Leach, supra note 23, at 
120. 
163. Picketing Scheduled by Negroes, CHARLO'ITE NEws, Apr. 19, 1963, at lB. 
164. Moye, supra note 27, at 172. 
165. King Addresses 7,500 at Charlotte Commencement, S. SCH. NEws, June 1963, at 13; 
Charlotte Commencement Exercises Questioned, S. SCH. NEws, Mar. 1963, at 13. 
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tels had agreed to operate on a desegregated basis: "The latest step 
which we believe the community will accept as both morally and eco-
nomically sound has been taken by a number of our hotels and motels 
in the opening of registration for the North Carolina Trade Fair on a 
non-restricted basis. "166 That announcement thwarted planned dem-
onstrations. Within a few weeks, however, it became clear that the 
hotels, following the conclusion of the Trade Fair, had reneged on 
their agreement to serve black patrons, as Hawkins himself was de-
nied service at the downtown Manger restaurant and hotel.167 Shortly 
thereafter, Hawkins ascertained that only two Charlotte hotels-the 
Queen Charlotte and the Barringer-would serve African Ameri-
cans.168 Accordingly, Hawkins announced that he would lead a new 
round of public demonstrations. On May 20, Hawkins made good on 
his threat, leading a march of about 65 persons, most of whom were 
Smith students, through the downtown area, complaining of the exclu-
sion of black customers from the city's hotels, restaurants, and thea-
ters.169 Hawkins promised additional demonstrations, including a 
massive demonstration in conjunction with King's visit to Charlotte.170 
Hawkins' activities deeply concerned the city's white business 
leaders. Mayor Brookshire, fearing that a season of racial unrest 
could inflict serious damage on the city's business climate, approached 
the president of the Charlotte Chamber of Commerce, Ed Burnside, 
to discuss ways of thwarting Hawkins' scheduled demonstrations. 
Both Brookshire and Burnside understood that the demonstrations in 
other parts of the state and the South had been "terrifically embar-
rassing [to] those cities" and economically damaging.l71 The Wall 
Street Journal had reported in 1961 that business leaders throughout 
166. Hotels, Motels Open to Negroes, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Apr. 24, 1963, at lB. See also 
Charlotte Picketing Postponed, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Apr. 21, 1963, at 1B; Chamber Action 
Significant One, supra note 162, at 1A; Letter from Stanford Brookshire to Reginald Hawkins 
{May 10, 1963) (on file with the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Community Relations Committee Pa-
pers, Box 1-5, Special Collections, Atkins Library, University of North Carolina at Charlotte); 
Interview with Reginald Hawkins, supra note 101. 
167. Manger Is Target of Integrationists, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, May 10, 1963, at 1C; Letter 
from John Cunningham to Stanford Brookshire (May 13, 1963) (on file with the Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Community Relations Committee Papers, Box 1-5, Special Collections, Atkins Li-
brary, University of North Carolina at Charlotte). 
168. Charles Robson, State Says Motel Within the Law, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, May 15, 
1963, at lB. 
169. J.C. Smith Students March Across Town, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, May 21, 1963, at lB. 
170. WAITERS, supra note 36, at 16. 
171. /d. at 4. In early May, widespread demonstrations had taken place in a number of 
North Carolina cities-Greensboro, Durham, Wilmington, and Fayetteville-resulting in large 
numbers of arrests. Demonstrations and Arrests Continue in Four N.C. Cities, CHARL01TE OB-
SERVER, May 19, 1963, at 2A. 
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the region feared a decline in new economic development as a result 
of racial problems. The Journal reported, for example, that Birming-
ham's violent resistance to the freedom riders during the spring of 
1961 had cost the city potential new capital in excess of $40 million.172 
The Charlotte Observer noted that other southern cities, such as 
Greensboro, Raleigh, and Birmingham, were suffering adverse public-
ity from public demonstrations during the spring of 1963 and that 
Charlotte should act quickly to avoid a similar fate.l73 
Brookshire proposed to Burnside that the Chamber orchestrate 
an effort to secure an agreement from Charlotte's restaurant, hotel, 
and theater operators to stop discriminating against black patrons.174 
If the entire business community acted in solidarity, no individual 
business would suffer on account of disturbing longstanding racial mo-
res. Burnside agreed and arranged for Observer editor McKnight to 
draft a resolution recommending that all Charlotte businesses "be 
opened immediately to all customers without regard to race, creed, or 
color."175 Two days after Hawkins' May 20 demonstration, the execu-
tive committee of the Chamber unanimously approved McKnight's 
resolution, and the full Chamber Board of Directors approved the res-
olution on the next day.176 In the wake of the announcement of 
the Chamber's actions, Hawkins cancelled additional scheduled 
demonstrations.177 
The Chamber's action was clearly motivated by its perception of 
how a summer of racial protests would affect the city's national image 
and its efforts to attract new business. During the Chamber Board 
meeting at which the resolution was approved, one board member 
specifically noted that Little Rock had not recruited any new industry 
for a few years following the school integration turmoil in that city 
during the late 1950s.17B By contrast, Charlotte had enjoyed an excel-
lent record of recruiting new business; throughout the early 1960s, an 
172. Business in Dixie: Many Southerners Say Racial Tension Slows Area's Economic Gains, 
WALL ST. J., May 26, 1961, at 1. 
173. Charlotte Needs No "D-Day" to Combat Discrimination, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, May 
22, 1963, at 2C. 
174. The Charlotte Chamber of Commerce had integrated its membership one year earlier. 
In 1962, the Chamber invited Secretary of State Dean rusk to speak at its annual meeting. At 
this time, the Chamber was an all-white organization. Sensing the importance of the Secretary 
of State's visit to the city's image, the Chamber invited a few prominent black businessmen to 
join the organization and then carefully arranged them so that they would be seated near 
friendly white faces at the annual dinner. WATTERS, supra note 36, at 39. 
175. Charlotte C ofC Asks Firms to Serve All, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, May 28, 1963, at 1A. 
176. /d. 
177. 8 Hotels, Motels Will Desegregate, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, May 30, 1963, at 1A. 
178. Charlotte Has Built its Integration Road, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, July 14, 1963, at lA. 
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average of over sixty new businesses opened each year in the city, 
employing almost 2,000 new workers.179 A season of racial unrest 
might damage that record. As one member of the Chamber board 
explained at the time, the desegregation initiative would serve as a 
"strong step toward encouraging new industry ... [and] expansion of 
existing industry. "180 
The next issue for the Chamber was that of compliance with the 
resolution. One restauranteur, J.W. "Slug" Claiborne, suggested that 
white business leaders invite black leaders to lunch at various restau-
rants and hotel dining rooms to "break" the color line. The Chamber 
leaders agreed and invited several restaurant and hotel operators to a 
meeting to solicit their cooperation. Stressing both the economic and 
moral reasons for these actions-and mentioning the negative impact 
of racial unrest on Little Rock and Birmingham-the Chamber per-
suaded several hotel owners to desegregate their restaurants.181 From 
May 29-31, several white businessmen ate lunch at hotel restaurants 
with some of the city's most prominent black leaders.182 By agree-
ment, and consistent with past practice, the local papers did not spec-
ify the restaurants involved until after the fact to avoid any possibility 
of unseemly reactions .. By the time the story broke in the local papers, 
many of the city's leading restaurants had already desegregated a few 
days earlier.183 Shortly thereafter, several hotels, theaters and about 
a third of the city's restaurants were desegregated in a similar 
fashion.184 
Brookshire sought compliance with the desegregation resolution 
for the next few months, meeting individually with restaurant owners 
to win their support. As Chamber Executive Vice President Charles 
Crawford noted: "We wanted [restaurant owners] to know that the 
179. Charlotte Chamber of Commerce, supra note 93. 
180. Charlotte C of CAsks Firms to Serve All, supra note 175, at 1A. 
181. NORTH CAROUNA AND THE NEGRO, supra note 162, at 54-57; WATTERS, supra note 36, 
at 4. 
182. Charlotte Has Built its Integration Road, supra note 178, at 1A. 
183. John Cunningham, Statement about Mayor's Committee on Community Relations 
(June 1963) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Charlotte-Mecklenberg Community Rela-
tions Papers, Box 1-5, Special Collections, Atkins Library, University of North carolina at Char-
lotte). Although the Charlotte Observer did report the fact that desegregation had taken place 
at several of the cities' hotel and motel restaurants, the paper waited three days before naming 
the restaurants. 8 Hotels, Motels Will Desegregate, supra note 177, at 1A; Unique Desegregation 
Plan Becomes Reality, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, June 1, 1%3, at lC. One restaurant date was 
changed to a new location to avoid a cameraman from a national television network. Charlotte 
Has Built its Integration Road, supra note 178, at 1A. 
184. /d. At the same time, the Charlotte City Council met and repealed all outstanding 
provisions in the city code mandating segregation. Race Progress Here Impressive to Bobby, 
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, July 7, 1963, at 2B. 
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business leadership of this community felt that this was the right thing 
to do. "185 Of particular importance, Brookshire pressured Frank 
Sherrill, owner of the popular S & W Cafeteria, to operate his restau-
rant on a desegregated basis. Many other restaurant operators had 
waited to see what Sherrill would do before taking action themselves. 
Finally, in mid-July, Sherrill relented, leading the way for several 
other restaurants to open their doors on a desegregated basis.186 . 
The efforts of Brookshire and the Chamber to move the city for-
ward on the public accommodations issue were facilitated by the fact 
that the city was not plagued by a large contingent of aggressive segre-
gationists anxious to preserve the traditional racial order at all costs. 
Throughout the early 1960s, white resistance groups were largely 
quiet. To be sure, Brookshire received threats on his life and had a 
cross burned in his yard.187 In addition, a Charlotte White Citizens' 
Council was formed in 1962 in response to earlier demands for public 
accommodations desegregation. Yet the Citizens' Council had little 
effect. Like earlier segregationist groups in Charlotte in the 1950s, no 
prominent business leaders, professionals, or politicians associated 
themselves with the Citizens' Council and it therefore was ineffectual 
during the 1963 desegregation efforts.1BB The Charlotte Observer, 
which criticized the Council's efforts to establish in Charlotte, claimed 
that the organization's views did not square with those of most 
Charlotteans: "[o]ur people, though opposed to radical, overnight 
changes, have been recognized throughout the nation for their accom-
modation to moderate, sensible change."189 
Those southern cities that voluntarily desegregated their public 
accommodations before the Civil Rights Act, such as Charlotte and 
Atlanta, are distinguishable from those cities that did not desegregate 
in large measure by the posture of the business community and the 
mayor's office. In both Charlotte and Atlanta, the business commu-
nity, under the leadership of moderate pro-business mayors, under-
stood that desegregation would translate into increased economic 
185. WATTERS, supra note 36, at 5. 
186. Telegram from Stanford Brookshire to Sherrill (June 13, 1963) (on file with the Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg Community Relations Committee Papers, Box 1-5, Special Collections, At-
kins Library, University of North Carolina at Charlotte); WASHINGTON (D.C.) DAILY News, 
July 25, 1963 (on file with the Stanford Brookshire Papers, Box 26-4, Special Collections, Atkins 
Library, University of North Carolina at Charlotte); Turning Point 25 Years Ago, Charlotte Be-
gan New Era in Race Relations, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, May 29, 1988, at 1D. 
187. /d. 
188. Leach, supra note 23, at 24-25. 
189. Our State Won't Go Backward, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Sept. 12, 1962, at 2B. 
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growth and thus took the lead in promoting desegregation.t90 Histo-
rian James Cobb, in his 1982 study of the efforts of southern business-
men during the twentieth century to promote their region to outside 
investors, concluded that southern businessmen, "concern[ ed] about a 
location's image in the eyes of new industrial investors," gave impor-
tant support to desegregation initiatives in a number of southern 
cities.191 
By contrast, white leaders in the cities of the deeper South that 
resisted public accommodations desegregation conCluded that holding 
the line on segregation outweighed all other concerns. In St. Augus-
tine, Florida, for example, a number of leading business leaders joined 
the John Birch Society, and proved to be more committed to main-
taining the racial status quo than economic development.192 St. Au-
gustine successfully resisted the desegregation of its public 
accommodations until the Civil Rights Act in July 1964 required such 
action. In other deep South communities, the business communities 
initially remained silent in the face of racial protest, allowing segrega-
tionists to control the public dialogue.193 
Yet even among moderate southern cities that chose to desegre-
gate their public accommodations in 1963 in response to demonstra-
tions, Charlotte's experience is distinctive. Black activists in Charlotte 
conducted one relatively small demonstration challenging segregated 
public accommodations in May 1963-with no arrests-well after 
demonstrations on a much larger scale had begun in other cities. Two 
days after that lone demonstration, Mayor Brookshire and the Cham-
ber of Commerce resolved to end discrimination in all of the city's 
public accommodations and then aggressively sought compliance with 
that resolution. This rapid response distinguishes Charlotte from vir-
tually every other North Carolina city and many other moderate up-
per South cities that confronted desegregation demands during the 
spring of 1963. 
The comparison with Greensboro is particularly striking. In that 
city, black activists conducted a series of demonstrations between May 
190. KENNETH K. BAILEY, SOUTHERN WHITE PROTESTANTISM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
148 (1964); REED SARRATI, THE ORDEAL OF DESEGREGATION: THE FIRST DECADE 285-86 
(1966). 
191. CoBB, supra note 11, at 149. 
192. CoLBURN, supra note 5; DAVID GoLDAELD, BLACK, WHITE, AND SouTHERN: RACE 
RELATIONS AND SOUTHERN CULTURE, 1940 TO THE PRESENT 133 (1990). 
193. Jacoway, supra note 21, at 8. 
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11 and June 7, 1963, resulting in over 1400 arrests.194 Unlike Char-
lotte, where white leaders immediately complied with the demonstra-
tors' demands, Greensboro's white elite instead tried to quell the 
demonstrations through a strict arrest policy. Greensboro Mayor 
David Schenck, unlike Brookshire, did not aggressively seek business 
support for desegregation. Moreover, when the Greensboro Chamber 
of Commerce did eventually resolve to end racial segregation in pub-
lic accommodations in June 1963, it did not take meaningful action to 
insure compliance. As a result, the Chamber resolution was not 
widely followed and the demonstrations continued.195 The example of 
Greensboro had a profound impact on Brookshire: "we did not want 
what was happening in Greensboro to happen in Charlotte."196 
Although virtually all public accommodations in Charlotte were 
desegregated by the fall of 1963, Greensboro would not enjoy full 
desgregation until after the passage of the Civil Rights Act the follow-
ing summer. The ensuing turmoil hurt the city's economic prospects. 
John Parramore of the Greensboro Chamber of Commerce later 
noted that the city's difficulties in desegregating its public accommo-
dations "severely crippled efforts to attract new industry to the 
city."197 
The difference between Charlotte and its moderate counterparts 
that reacted more slowly to desegregation demands lies primarily in 
the fact that Charlotte's white elite proved itself to be particularly 
willing to accommodate racial change in order to preserve its 
favorable business climate and progressive national image. Moreover, 
Charlotte possessed a strong leader-Mayor Brookshire-whose ex-
tensive contacts in the business community allowed him to secure 
compliance with his desegregation initiative in remarkably short 
order. 
The quick resolution of the desegregation controversy in Char-
lotte received wide attention. When Martin Luther King arrived in 
Charlotte in late May 1963 to address graduation ceremonies at the 
city's black high schools, he applauded the city's actions, calling the 
194. CHAFE, supra note 5, at 167; James Fanner, Mass Action Makes N.C. Live Up to Liberal 
Reputation, CORE-LATOR 1 (July 1963) (on file with the North Carolina Collection, University 
of North Carolina (Chapel Hill)). Between May 15 and 18 alone, 940 demonstrators were ar-
rested in Greensboro. MEIER & RuoWICK, supra note 3, at 217. 
195. CHAFE, supra note 5, at 167-214. 
196. Turning Point 25 Years Ago, Charlotte Began a New Era in Race Relations, supra note 
186. 
197. Greensboro Race Crisis: A Summing Up, GREENSBORO DAILY NEWS, Sept. 15, 1963, at 
1C. 
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desegregation developments "significant."198 The media, led by Me-
-Knight's Observer, gave wide coverage to the city's desegregation ac-
tion.199 Ultimately, positive news stories about the Chamber's actions 
were carried throughout the nation and even the world. Both Radio 
Free Europe and Voice of America broadcasted special segments on 
the desegregation of Charlotte's public accommodations.200 In June, 
Attorney General Robert Kennedy began to correspond with Brook-
shire seeking the mayor's help in facilitating similar racial change in 
other southern cities through the use of bi-racial community commit-
tees; the Observer gave significant play to the interchange.20l Two 
months later, President John Kennedy, with an implicit reference to 
Charlotte, urged U.S. mayors to establish bi-racial committees to re-
solve community problems.202 In August, ABC News traveled to 
Charlotte to analyze the events of that summer as part of a documen-
tary on civil rights; the network took its cameras to a meeting of the 
Mayor's Community Relations Committee.203 Brookshire was 
flooded with requests for information about how Charlotte had han-
dled the desegregation crisis.204 
This widespread publicity brought increased convention business 
and helped attract new industry to the city. Eastern Air Lines, for 
example, placed a major computerized reservations center in Char-
lotte within the next year.205 Presidents of major out-of-state corpora-
198. King Addresses 7,500 At Charlotte Commencement, supra note 165, at 13. 
199. Charlotte C ofC Asks Firms to Serve All, supra note 175, at 1A; Chamber Action Signifi-
cant One, CliARLOTIE OBSERVER, May 28, 1963, at 1A. 
200. Stanford Brookshire, This Decade of Progress or Peril (1963) (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with the Stanford Brookshire Papers, Box 26,-4, Special Collections, Atkins Library, Uni-
versity of North Carolina at Charlotte); WAITERS, supra note 36, at 9. 
201. Letter from Robert Kennedy to Stanford Brookshire (June 24, 1963); Letter from 
Brookshire to Kennedy (June 28, 1963) (on file with the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Community 
Relations Committee Papers, Box 1-5, Special Collections, Atkins Library, University of North 
Carolina at Charlotte). 
202. Letter from Thomas Francis to Stanford Brookshire (Aug. 13, 1963) (on file with the 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Community Relations Committee Papers, Box 1-5, Special Collections, 
Atkins Library, University of North Carolina at Charlotte). 
203. Memorandum from John Cunningham to Mayor's Committee (Aug. 23, 1963) (on file 
with the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Community Relations Committee Papers, Box 1-5, Special Col-
lections, Atkins Library, University of North Carolina at Charlotte). 
204. See, e.g., Letter from Stanford Brookshire to Elwood Sachsenmaier (May 30, 1963); 
Letter from E.C. Brandon, Jr. to William Veeder (June 4, 1963) (on file with the Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Community Relations Committee Papers, Box 1-5, Special Collection, Atkins Li-
brary, University of North Carolina at Charlotte). 
205. WAlTERS, supra note 36, at 9, 22. 
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tions with existing facilities in Charlotte wrote Brookshire to express 
support for the city's actions.zo6 
Many contemporaries attributed the desegregation of Charlotte's 
public accommodations to the city leaders' strong moral convictions 
on racial issues. To be sure, Mayor Brookshire, who played a major 
role in the desegregation efforts, was disturbed by the moral injustice 
of racial discrimination in employment, public accommodations, and 
education. In June 1963, Brookshire questioned the morality of 
American race relations in an address to a civic club: "Why should we 
members of the white race, because we happen to be in the majority, 
deny the freedoms, rights and opportunities we enjoy to members of 
minority groups? And yet, the social and economic patterns long ac-
cepted in this country do just that. "207 For a southern white mayor in 
the early 1960s, it was an extraordinary statement. Yet Brookshire, 
motivated in significant measure by his religious convictions, had be-
come personally convinced of the immorality of at least certain as-
pects of Jim Crow and sought to nudge his city towards greater 
integration. . 
Yet the desegregation of Charlotte's public accommodations 
must be understood in significant measure as a result of the business 
community's perception that extended public demonstrations would 
harm the city's moderate reputation and thereby subvert efforts to at-
tract new industry to the city. The primary movers in the desegrega-
tion activities conceded as much. 
Brookshire explained his views in a June 1963 article he was re-
quested to write for the New York Herald Tribune: 
[as a result of demonstrations,] the community's pocketbook is 
placed in jeopardy, as Birmingham and other cities have learned 
from experience. Whether we like it or not', we are pressed by cir-
cumstances to choose either resistance or to break with long ac-
cepted social and economic patterns. . . . [D ]iscrimination based on 
the color of a man's skin is legally and morally wrong and economi-
cally unsound.208 
Time and time again, Brookshire would explain to civic audiences the 
motives behind the desegregation of its public accommodations: 
"[Charlotte acted) out of social conscience, civic pride and economic 
206. See, e.g., Letter from John Simon, President of APCO, Inc., to Stanford Brookshire 
(June 3, 1963) (on file with the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Community Relations Committee Pa-
pers, Box 1-5, Special Collections, Atkins Library, University of North Carolina at Charlotte). 
207. Rights, Responsibility Called '2-Way Street,' CHARLOTIE OBSERVER, July 6, 1963, at lB. 
208. N.Y. HERALD TRIB., June 16, 1963 (on file with the Stanford Brookshire Papers, Box 
26-4, Special Collections, Atkins Library, University of North Carolina at Charlotte). 
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considerations. "209 Editor McKnight, who drafted the Chamber of 
Commerce desegregation resolution, commented that although the 
moral motivation was present in the desegregation effort, economic 
realities were more important. Another Chamber board member 
tried to persuade his colleagues to support the desegregation resolu-
tion by arguing that it was not "a question of right or wrong ... but 
whether you will be smart or stupid."210 The African-American com-
munity also perceived the importance of the economic motivations; as 
one black leader commented at the time: 
I would like to say that there were moral motives (for the changes). 
I can't. There is some interested Christian leadership. But for 
most, I think they were looking at this thing in cold turkey, good 
business sense. Charlotte needs this good image to bring new indus-
try .... And Birmingham is in the back of all this.211 
Birmingham was indeed behind all of it. The violence of that 
city's desegregation conflict convinced Charlotte's civic leaders that 
action must be taken to prevent similar action. Charlotte News editor 
Perry Morgan commented in 1964 that the public accommodations de-
segregation would not have taken place "without Birmingham. "212 
That view was widely shared among the city's leaders.2t3 
Many of Charlotte's business leaders probably did not personally 
favor racial mixing-Brookshire, for example, opposed interracial 
marriage and social mixing of the races214-but for most leaders, the 
city's economic health was more important than the maintenance of 
certain racial traditions. Harry Ashmore's earlier description of the 
typical southern Chamber of Commerce had application in Charlotte: 
It is not that the bustling gentlemen at the local Chambers of Com-
merce ... are particularly concerned with race as a moral problem; 
on the contrary, they, like most of their fellow Southerners, wish the 
matter of integration would quietly go away .... But they also rec-
ognize that sustained racial disorder would be fatal to their effort to 
lure new industries and new capital. ... 2 15 
209. Stanford Brookshire, Guidelines in Community Relations (May 1963) (on file with the 
Stanford Brookshire Papers, Box 26-4, Special Collections, Atkins Library, Unversity of North 
Carolina at Charlotte). 
210. Charlotte Has Built its Integration Road, supra note 178, at 1A. 
211. /d. 
212. WATI'ERS, supra note 36, at 81. 
213. School Board Chair David Harris, for example, noted in 1964 that "[w]e don't want to 
risk a Birmingham. We've avoided bombings. It only takes one to get you in trouble." /d. at 68. 
214. Intermarriage Stand Attacked by Mayor, CHARLOlTE NEws, Feb. 25, 1963, at 1B; Letter 
from Stanford Brookshire to Charles Jones (Mar. 7, 1963) (on file with the Charlotte-Mecklen-
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The desegregation of the city's public accommodations provided 
an important lesson for the black community of Charlotte. Accom-
modation brought good personal relationships, but confrontation 
brought results. Mayor Brookshire, who was largely responsible for 
securing the support of Charlotte's business community for desegrega-
tion, acknowledged at the time that he would have preferred "peace-
ful gradualism" on the public accommodations issue, but that the 
pressure tactics of Hawkins had pushed him along faster than he 
wanted to go.216 Litigation and demonstrations were confrontational 
and alienated the white power structure, but they forced changes in 
the racial status quo. There is no question that the desegregation of 
Charlotte's public accommodations would not have happened as soon 
as it did-one year prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 mandated 
such action-without the pressure tactics of Hawkins. Hawkins and 
his threat of demonstrations forced the white business community to 
act. 
In June 1963, a few weeks after the Chamber of Commerce issued 
its desegregation resolution, Hawkins threatened additional demon-
strations directed at the denial of hospital privileges to African-Amer-
ican physicians at Memorial Hospital. He urged the city's black 
doCtors to boycott Good Samaritan as a way of protesting their exclu-
sion from Memorial. Hawkins also threatened to seek assistance from 
the Kennedy Administration to halt construction of a new addition at 
Memorial if the hospital persisted in its discriminatory practices.217 
Brookshire was furious. He immediately sent a telegram to Haw-
kins claiming he would hold Hawkins responsible for any ill effect that 
might flow from such actions and charging that Hawkins had de-
faulted on his promise to bring all racial complaints to the Mayor's 
Committee on Community Relations.218 Once again, however, the 
threatened protest worked. Within days, hospital privileges were ex-
tended to black physicians. 219 
In the meantime, Hawkins filed yet another complaint with the 
federal government complaining that black patients had been denied 
admission to Memorial due to their race. Investigators from the Pub-
216. Stanford Brookshire, Unpublished Speech (1963) (transcript available with Stanford 
Brookshire Papers, Box 26-4, Special Collections, Atkins Library, University of North Carolina 
at Charlotte). 
217. Hawkins Says He May Ask U.S. Action, CHARLOITE OBSERVER, June 24, 1963, at 4B. 
218. Telegram from Stanford Brookshire to Reginald Hawkins, June 21, 1963, (on file with 
the Stanford Brookshire Papers, Box 26-4, Special Collections, Atkins Library, University of 
North Carolina at Charlotte). 
219. Memorial Staff Votes on July 9, CHARLO'ITE OBSERVER, July 2, 1963, at lB. 
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lie Health Service concluded that Memorial was indeed discriminating 
against black patients in violation of federal law. Subsequently, in Au-
gust 1963, Memorial pledged to open "all hospital services to Negroes 
on the same basis as for whites."220 1\vo years later, the NAACP com-
plained to the federal government that two private Charlotte hospitals 
that received federal aid (Mercy and Presbyterian) discriminated on 
the basis of race. In May 1965, the United States Public Health Ser-
vice announced that both hospitals would cease to receive federal aid 
on account of their discriminatory practices. Eventually, the hospitals 
agreed to operate on a nondiscriminatory basis.z21 
Finally, in 1964, Hawkins used a combination of public demon-
strations and litigation to desegregate the downtown YMCA. 
Although the YMCA had begun operating its cafeteria and meeting 
rooms on a non-discriminatory basis in response to the 1960 sit-ins, it 
continued to exclude African Americans from membership. In May 
1964, Hawkins initiated demonstrations at the facility to challenge its 
exclusionary policies; the organization's general secretary criticized 
the picketing, claiming that it would only serve to hurt black inter-
ests.222 Three months later, Hawkins filed suit pursuant to the public 
accommodations section of the newly enacted federal Civil Rights 
Act.223 One month later, the YMCA Board caved in, enacting a reso-
lution providing for the complete desegregation of the facility.224 The 
litigation had proved decisive. 
Charlotte desegregated its public accommodations before most 
other southern cities and before Congress required such action in 
1964. Likewise, Charlotte began assigning students on the basis of ge-
ography rather than race long before most southern school districts 
did the same. White Charlotte took these actions to retain control 
over the integration process. Public demonstrations and litigation 
threatened to disturb the city's carefully nurtured image for racial 
moderation and preference for peaceful racial advances. The turbu-
lent experience in Birmingham during the spring of 1963 had a 
profound influence on Charlotte's decisionmakers. Just as Little Rock 
had provided an important benchmark in the late 1950s and early 
220. Open-Door Policy Starts Immediately, CHARLOTIE OBSERVER, Aug. 24, 1963, at lB; 
Hospital Race Bars Fall, CHARLOTTE NEws, Aug. 23, 1963, at lB. 
221. Mercy Complies With Rights Act, CHARLOTIE OBSERVER, July 21, 1965, at lC. 
222. Hawkins-Led Force Slated to Picket Central YMCA, CHARLOTIE OBSERVER, May 13, 
1964, at 15A. 
223. FBI Checks 2nd Rights Protest Against YMCA, CHARLOITE OBSERVER, Aug. 16, 1964, 
at lC. 
224. YMCA's Integration Steps Are Revealed, CHARLOITE OBSERVER, Apr. 20, 1965, at lB. 
740 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:689 
1960s, Birmingham emerged during the spring of 1963 as a symbol for 
the error of resistance. The city's white business community, inti-
mately linked with the city's power structure, understood the eco-
nomic necessity of avoiding racial conflict even at the expense of 
token integration, an understanding that business leaders in other 
southern cities, such as Birmingham, St. Augustine, and New Orleans, 
lacked. 
But the actions of Brookshire and the white business elite in 1963 
would not have been forthcoming without the perseverance of the 
black activists, particularly Hawkins. As Brookshire later conceded, 
Charlotte engaged in no desegregation during the post-Brown era 
"without threat."225 This convergence of black activism and white 
self- interest contributed to the early and relatively peaceful desegre-
gation of Charlotte's public accommodations. 
IlL CHARLOTIE'S RESPONSE TO THE DEMAND 
FOR ScHOOL BusiNG 
Charlotte's desegregation of its public accommodations did not 
signal a dramatic reordering in the patterns of racial separation in the 
city. Although Brookshire was undoubtedly one of the most racially 
liberal southern mayors during the 1960s and strongly supported im-
proving the economic position of Charlotte's black underclass, the 
mayor remained a steadfast opponent of racial mixing on a social ba-
sis, and undertook no effort to challenge the city's well-entrenched 
patterns of residential segregation. Indeed, the city's urban renewal 
policies of the early 1960s under Brookshire's tenure only exacerbated 
patterns of residential segregation.226 Charlotte had been one of the 
first cities in the South to integrate its schools and public accommoda-
tions, but the city's basic patterns of physical and social separation 
remained intact: throughout the 1960s, the city remained one of the 
most residentially segregated cities in the United States. Brookshire, 
despite his liberal views on desegregating public accommodations, 
found no fault with these patterns of social and physical separation: 
"Our Negroes in Charlotte take considerable pride in their own 
race. . . . They prefer their own churches. There is no effort to cross 
to white churches. . . . They have some fine neighborhoods, and are 
anxious to preserve their quality."227 
225. WAITERS, supra note 36, at 11-12. 
226. Birth of a Possible Gheno, CHARLOITE OBSERVER, Dec. 26, 1966, at 1B; The '60s in 
Charlotte a Decade of Challenge and Change, CHARLOITE OBSERVER, Jan. 15, 1989, at 1C. 
227. WAITERS, supra note 36, at 10 (ellipses in original}. 
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As a result of this residential segregation and the Charlotte-
Mecklenburg School Board's practice of continuing to assign many 
students to school on the basis of their race,228 the schools remained 
largely segregated in the mid-1960s. When schools opened in Char-
lotte in August 1964, only about three percent of the more than 20,000 
African-American children in the school system were assigned to a 
majority white school.229 The Board still assigned about half of the 
African-American students to school on a racial basis and most of 
those students assigned to school on the basis of geography attended 
single-race schools on account of the city's extensive residential segre-
gation. As a result, the NAACP initiated litigation against the Board 
in January 1965 challenging the Board's pupil assignment practices. 
The local NAACP retained attorney Julius Chambers, a new arri-
val to the city of Charlotte, to file the litigation. Though only twenty-
nine years old at the time, over the course of the next decade, Cham-
bers would establish himself as the preeminent civil rights lawyer in 
the South. Chambers had graduated from the University of North 
Carolina Law School in 1962 where he had compiled an extraordinary 
record, earning the top rank in his class and becoming the first African 
American to serve as editor-in-chief of the North Carolina Law Re-
view.230 Following his law school graduation and a post-graduate year 
at Columbia Law School, Chambers joined the legal staff of the 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund in New York City handling race discrim-
ination cases. After one year in New York, Chambers moved to Char-
lotte to open a civil rights law practice, working in close cooperation 
with the Legal Defense Fund's New York lawyers.231 Chambers 
would have a profound impact on future desegregation efforts in 
Charlotte. 
In response to the litigation, the Board eliminated all race-based 
pupil assignments and converted to an assignment system based exclu-
sively on geography. Accordingly, the federal courts ruled that the 
228. The Board did begin assigning some students to school on the basis of geography in 
1962. See supra text accompanying notes 138-39. Still, by 1964, a majority of students were 
assigned to school on a racial basis. 
229. Desegregation: School Board Sees Some Changes, CHARLOTIE OBSERVER, Feb. 3, 1965, 
at lB. 
230. He Hopes He's Set Example, CHARLOTIE OBSERVER, May 5,1961, at SA; Negro Named 
Editor of Law Publication at State University, S. SCH. NEws, June 1961, at 5; NAACP Press 
Release, Top Law Student at University of North Carolina is Lauded by NAACP (on file with 
the NAACP Papers, Box 111-A-288, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.). Chambers was 
also the first black student to serve as editor-in-chief of a law review at a southern state law 
school. ld. 
231. How Did Attorney Earn Those Fees?, CHARLOTTE NEws, Mar. 18, 1975, at lB. 
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Board's assignment plan passed constitutional muster.232 Although 
the courts dismissed the NAACP's legal challenge, the filing of the 
suit had prompted the Board to finally eliminate all pupil assignments 
based exclusively on race. Board member William Poe acknowledged 
in 1966 that "everything we've done in integration has been done be-
cause of the threat of a court suit. "233 
In a city as residentially segregated as Charlotte, however, a pupil 
assignment plan based on geography left many schools segregated be-
cause most students lived in racially homogeneous neighborhoods. 
Yet most federal courts in the mid-1960s held that although school 
boards must eliminate race-based pupil assignments, they did not have 
a duty to take additional action to integrate schools in the face of ex-
tensive residential segregation.234 In 1968, in Green v. County School 
Board,235 the United States Supreme Court appeared to question that 
orthodoxy by holding that school boards had an affirmative duty to do 
more than simply establish a racially neutral assignment plan; instead, · 
they must "convert promptly to a system without a 'white' school and 
a 'Negro' school, but just schools."236 The Green decision, however, 
dealt with a small rural school district; left unclear was whether the 
decision required urban school boards to overcome residential segre-
gation through the use of extensive school busing. 
Four months after the Green decision, in September 1968, Cham-
bers and the NAACP reopened their litigation against the Charlotte-
Mecklenburg School Board, arguing that Green compelled the Board 
to take additional action to overcome the city's residential segrega-
tion.237 In April 1969, federal district court judge James McMillan 
agreed, issuing an order directing the Board to devise a new assign-
ment plan that would accomplish greater desegregation.238 The 
McMillan desegregation order, which contemplated the use of wide-
232. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 243 F. Supp. 667 (W.D.N.C. 1965), affd, 
369 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1966) (en bane). Even though the Board's plan to eliminate all race-based 
pupil assignments would not take effect until the 1966-1967 school year, the federal district court 
ruled in 1965 that this prospective plan to eliminate racial assignments satisfied constitutional 
standards. 
233. Board of Education Wavers From True Academic Goals, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, May 
19, 1966, at 2C. 
234. See, e.g., Bowman v. County Sch. Bd. of Educ., 382 F.2d 326 (4th Cir. 1967); Kemp v. 
Beasley, 352 F.2d 14 (8th Cir. 1965). 
235. 391 u.s. 430 (1968). 
236. /d. at 442. 
237. Motion for Further Relief, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ. (Sept. 6, 
1968) (on file with the Julius L. Chambers Papers, Special Collections, Atkins Library, Univer-
sity of North Carolina at Charlotte). 
238. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 300 F. Supp. 1358 (W.D.N.C. 1969). 
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spread busing, challenged racial attitudes at a far deeper level than 
had the desegregation efforts of the early 1960s. School busing, par-
ticularly the busing of white children to inner-city black schools, 
proved far more difficult for the white community to accept than had 
integrated restaurants and hotels. As one business leader later com-
mented: "it was one thing to go to lunch with a Johnson C. Smith 
professor; it was quite another to send one's child to school in a black 
neighborhood. "239 
The McMillan desegregation order produced a groundswell of 
opposition in the white community. Board chair William Poe an-
nounced that the order had "revolutionary implications" and that the 
Board would use every legal avenue to fight it.240 Several other white 
Board members joined Poe in his attack on the judge and within 
weeks, about twenty thousand parents had signed petitions opposing 
"involuntary" busing of students to achieve desegregation.241 
Eventually, the Board decided to comply in part with the judge's 
order by closing several inner-city black schools and then reassigning 
those students to suburban white schools. The Board's plan left many 
schools segregated, but did increase the number of black children at-
tending integrated schools. Not surprisingly, the announcements of 
the school closings provoked strident protests from the African-
American community.242 Confronted with opposition from both the 
white and black community, Judge McMillan permitted the Board to 
operate the schools pursuant to its partial desegregation plan for the 
1969-1970 school year, but made it clear that further changes would 
have to be made in the coming year to satisfy constitutional 
standards. 243 
During the fall of 1969, the Board indicated to Judge McMillan 
that it would not produce an assignment plan that desegregated every 
239. Interview with Robert Culbertson, in Charlotte, N.C. (Oct. 14, 1992). 
240. Poe Calls Coun Rule Revolutionary, CHARLO'ITE OBSERVER, Apr. 25, 1969, at lB. 
241. Couns Must Decide Schools' Racial Issue, CHARLoTTE OBsERVER, May 25,1969, at lB. 
242. School Plan Attacked, Defended at Hearing, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Aug. 6, 1969, at 
lA. There were two strands to this opposition. One group, represented by the NAACP, favored 
integration but strongly objected to burdening exclusively black children with the extensive bus-
ing that desegregation required. A second group simply favored the retention of black schools, 
minimizing the value of integrated schools. This split in the Charlotte African-American com-
munity reflected a larger split within the national civil rights community over the wisdom of 
school integration. Although the national office of the NAACP remained steadfast in its com-
mitment to racial integration, other civil rights groups, primarily the Congress of Racial Equality 
favored the retention of black schools. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving 1Wo Masters: Integration 
Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE LJ. 470 (1976); Why 
School Busing is in Trouble, U.S. NEws AND WoRLD REP, Oct. 13, 1969, at 42. 
243. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 306 F. Supp. 1291 (W.D.N.C. 1969). 
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school in the system as he had ordered; as a result, McMillan ap-
pointed a special consultant to devise a desegregation plan that would 
do so.244 In February 1970, McMillan ordered the Board to imple-
ment his special consultant's desegregation plan, which eliminated 
every majority black school in the system through the use of extensive 
busing.245 No federal judge had ever ordered a school system to adopt 
as extensive a busing plan as McMillan had for Charlotte.246 
Since the Brown decision, Charlotte had prided itself on its ability 
to adapt to changing expectations in matters of race. McMillan's bus-
ing order, however, tested the white community's resilience in an un-
paralleled manner. Within hours of the issuance of the order, a wave 
of opposition swept the community, soon spreading throughout the 
state and even the nation. On the evening on which the decision was 
announced, antibusing picketers marched outside of McMillan's 
home; the picketing eventually spread to the courthouse and the of-
fices of the Charlotte Observer, which had endorsed the busing or-
der.247 Within days, the Concerned Parents Association (CPA), a 
white an~ibusing group established the prior spring, organized an 
eighty-thousand-signature petition drive seeking a boycott of the 
court's order. The CPA's calling card-NO FORCED BUSING 
bumper stickers-appeared throughout the city.248 In the following 
weeks, the CPA called upon state and national leaders to intervene on 
their behalf to stop the threat of busing.249 
In the wake of the widespread turmoil surrounding McMillan's 
busing order, the city's business community took no action to facilitate 
its implementation. The Chamber of Commerce, for _example, so vital 
to Charlotte's earlier desegregation, remained silent, a fact noted by 
the Charlotte Observer: "Unfortunately, community leadership has 
not functioned in the sound tradition of the past decade's experience 
where the school desegregation crisis is concerned. The greatest sin 
244. Board Has Its Last Chance to Help Draw School Plan, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Dec. 3, 
1969, at 20; Interim School Plan May Be Drawn Soon, CHARLOTIE OBSERVER, Dec. 5, 1969, at 
1C; Letter from James McMillan to Jesse Riley, Nov. 18, 1969 (on file with the James B. McMil-
lan Papers, Southern Historical Collection, Chapel Hill, N.C.) 
245. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 265 (W.D.N.C. 1970). 
246. Moderate Leaders Fall Silent in the South, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1970, at lA. 
247. McMillan's Home Picketed, CHARLOTIE OBSERVER, Feb. 9, 1970, at 4C; Parents Picket 
Observer-Rap Anti-Busing Coverage, CHARLOTIE OBSERVER, Feb. 14, 1970, at 58. 
248. Frank Barrows, School Busing: Charlotte, N.C., 230 ATLANTic MONTHLY 17, 18 (Nov. 
1972). 
249. 1700 Protest Desegregation, Busing Order, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Feb. 9, 1970, at 1C; 
Concerned Parents Propose Boycott, CHARLOTIE OBSERVER, Feb. 6, 1970, at 19A. 
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among community spokesmen has been silence in this instance. "25o 
One business leader later commented on the significance of the 
Chamber's reaction: 
Had the Chamber gotten involved earlier, it would have made a big 
difference .... Had the Chamber and the presidents of the city's 
major corporations come in and acted as a mediating force, there 
would have been an easier resolution of the problem.25 1 
But in the early 1970s, no Chamber leader emerged to facilitate reso-
lution of the desegregation controversy as had Brookshire several 
years earlier. Mayor John Belk, another former Chamber president, 
remained virtually silent throughout the entire busing controversy. 
The local bar said little as well. The North Carolina Law Record, in a 
brief article entitled Where Are You Charlotte? criticized Charlotte 
lawyers for their refusal to defend McMillan against the personal at-
tacks on his character, noting that "we have few attorneys rallying to 
the defense of a man crucified simply because he interpreted the law 
as he thought was right. "252 
The Chamber's differing reaction to the 1970 busing crisis and the 
1963 public accommodations controversy was due to the very different 
demands that each placed on the city. Previous integration efforts had 
been largely token and involved limited social contact between the 
races. But McMillan's busing order would require extensive mixing of 
black and white children, often in black neighborhoods. Accordingly, 
busing tested the willingness of the city's white leadership to accept 
racial change in unprecedented ways. 
Moreover, many of Charlotte's white leaders believed that Mc-
Millan's busing order exceeded constitutional requirements and that 
250. 'Charlotte Way' Will Serve Us Again in School Crisis, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Jan. 30, 
1970, at 2C. 
251. Interview with Robert Culbertson, supra note 239. 
252. Where are You Charlotte? N.C. L. REc., Apr. 1970, at 7. Some lawyers did write to 
McMillan to express their support. See, e.g., Letter from Louis Bledsoe to James McMillan 
(Aug. 20, 1969) (on file with the McMillan Papers, Southern Historical Collection, Chapel Hill, 
N.C.). But few lawyers spoke publicly in his defense, notwithstanding McMillan's private pleas 
that his fellow lawyers help explain to a confused community the demands of the Constitution. 
McMillan wrote letters to several attorneys during the winter of 1970 seeking their help, telling 
one correspondent, for example, that "[CPA leader] Dr. Roberson and a lot of other people 
could understand this situation better if you lawyers would talk to them about law." Letter from 
James McMillan to Samuel Williams (Feb. 10, 1970) (on file with the McMillan Papers, Southern 
Historical Collection, Chapel Hill, N.C.). 
To be sure, a few community groups such as the League of Women Voters did support the 
busing order, as did the Charlotte Observer. But the most influential voices in the community 
remained silent. School Busing Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 5, House Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 327-28 (1972) (statement of Lucy W. Benson, President, League of 
Women Voters); School Decision Will Test Belief in System Here, CHARLOITE OBSERVER, Feb. 8, 
1970, at 2B. 
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the appellate courts would reverse it. This belief was fueled by the 
fact that many other federal judges throughout the South, unlike Mc-
Millan, were approving desegregation plans that kept a large number 
of majority black schools in place. In city after city-Atlanta, Ft. Lau-
derdale, Ft. Worth, Jackson, Knoxville, Memphis, Miami, Mobile, 
Norfolk, Orlando, Winston-Salem2s3_federal judges required less de-
segregation than had McMillan. Charlotte News editor Perry Morgan 
consistently attacked McMillan for being out of the mainstream: 
[A]lthough the court's right to hand down its interpretation of the 
law is indisputable, also indisputable is that Judge McMillan's inter-
pretation is by no means universally shared. There is thoughtful op-
position to the theory that racial balance is the ultimate and only 
talisman of quality education. There is from impeccable sources 
disagreement that the constitution requires racial balance in defi-
ance of housing pattems.254 
State and national politicians also criticized both McMillan and 
the use of busing to overcome residential segregation, which contrib-
uted to the view that McMillan's busing order would be reversed. 
North Carolina's senior United States Senator Sam Ervin sharply at-
tacked McMillan: "I am incapabie of comprehending why any Ameri-
can is opposed to a freedom of choice plan which grants equality of 
freedom to all parents of children of all races. Once again, we are 
confronted in America with the old issue of governmental tyranny 
versus liberty."2ss North Carolina Governor Robert Scott expressed 
his opposition to busing as well: 
I am personally committed to doing everything lawful to preserve 
our neighborhood schools. The neighborhood-school concept has 
253. Why the School Board Should Appeal and the Courts Should Answer, CHARLOITE 
NEws, Feb. 7, 1970, at 14A (Atlanta); Allen v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 312 F. Supp. 1127 (S.D. 
Fla.), rev'd, 432 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1970) (Ft. Lauderdale); Flax v. Potts, 333 F. Supp. 711 (N.D. 
Tex. 1970), rev'd, 450 F.2d 1118 (5th Cir. 1971) (Fort Worth); Goss v. Board of Educ. of Knox-
ville, 320 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. Tenn. 1970); Northcross v. Board of Educ. of Memphis, 397 U.S. 232 
(1970); Robinson v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 97 (W.O. Tenn. 1970), rev'd, 442 
F. 2d 255 (6th Cir. 1971) (Memphis metropolitan area); Beckett v. School Bd. of Norfolk, 308 F. 
Supp. 1274 (E.D. Va. 1969); 'Unitary' Plan Leaves 3 Schools All Black, CHARLOITE NEws, Feb. 
18, 1970, at 14A (Orlando); Scott v. Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Bd. of Educ., 317 F. Supp. 
453 (M.D.N.C. 1970), Judge Denies Mixing Suit, CHARLOlTE OBSERVER, Feb. 20, 1970 (Win-
ston-Salem). 
254. Schools: Appeal Needed, CHARLOlTE NEWS, Nov. 11, 1969, at lOA. 
255. 1700 Protest Desegregation, Busing Order, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Feb. 9, 1970, at 1C. 
Senator Ervin continued his attack on McMillan on the floor of Congress: 
These policies and rules to bus students and to force integration which are being en-
forced in such a harsh manner are . . . rules and policies made out of the head and from 
the imagination of Federal judges exercising the most unbounded discretion that any 
judges have ever exercised at any time in the history of this Nation, and exercising a 
discretion which might be becoming to totalitarian countries. 
116 CONG. REC. 3071 (1970). 
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been the strength of our public education system in North Carolina 
and our state has been committed to that policy for some time. It is 
sound educational policy and must be preserved.256 
747 
Shortly thereafter, Governor Scott joined the chorus of leaders seek-
ing President Richard Nixon's intervention, reminding Nixon of his 
campaign pledge to limit school busing.2s1 
Ultimately, the Nixon Administration responded. On March 24, 
1970, President Nixon delivered a major address on school desegrega-
tion, setting forth his Administration's policy: "[t]he neighborhood 
school will be deemed the most appropriate . . . system," and 
"[t]ransportation of pupils beyond normal geographic school zones for 
the purpose of achieving racial balance will not be required."258 
Nixon implicitly criticized McMillan's February order by labeling 
some recent court decisions as "untypical" and "beyond ... generally 
accepted principles" and that "[u ]nless affirmed by the Supreme 
Court" he would not "consider them as precedents to guide adminis-
tration policy elsewhere."259 The statements of Senator Ervin, Gover-
nor Scott, and President Nixon all received extensive coverage and 
gave further legitimacy to those in Charlotte favoring resistance to the 
court. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit con-
sidered McMillan's order in an expedited fashion and in May 1970 
issued a split decision, affirming the order as it pertained to junior and 
high school students but remanding the order for further considera-
tion as it pertained to elementary school students.260 Both sides in the 
case sought review before the Supreme Court which agreed in June 
1970 to hear the case and which reinstated McMillan's busing order 
pending its decision.261 Shortly thereafter, the city's leadership re-
quested the Court to give the case immediate consideration. The 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg School Board, the Charlotte City Council, 
and the Mecklenburg County Board of Commissioners passed a joint 
resolution requesting such action because of the confusion in the city 
concerning the legitimacy of the McMillan busing order: 
256. ADDRESSES AND PuBuc PAPERS OF REOBERT WALTER Scon: GoVERNOR oF NoRTH 
CAROUNA, 1969-1973, at 549 (Memory F. Mitchell ed., 1974). 
257. /d. at 561. 
258. 116 CoNo. REc. 8880 (1970). (statement by the President on Elementary and Secondary 
School Desegregation). 
259. Robert B. Semple, Jr., Nixon Plans $1.5 Billion to Improve Segregated Schools, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 25, 1970, at 1A. 
260. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 431 F.2d 138 (4th Cir. 1970) (en bane). 
261. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 399 U.S. 926 (1970). 
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Past experience shows that Charlotte-Mecklenburg will face up to 
its problems and will respond to the leadership of its elected offi-
cials once its citizens understand what must be done and why. How-
ever, the present posture of our local school desegregation case is 
such that neither the community nor its leaders know what ulti-
mately will be required of them when the United States Supreme 
Court rules on our case.262 
Shortly thereafter, the Charlotte Chamber of Commerce petitioned 
Fourth Circuit Chief Judge Clement Haynsworth to stay McMillan's 
busing order pending consideration of the case by the Supreme Court. 
Although not a party to the litigation, the Chamber told Haynsworth 
that the busing controversy had divided the city "in a way in which it 
has never been divided" and urged the judge to postpone implementa-
tion of the busing plan until the Supreme Court had the opportunity 
to resolve the matter.263 Haynsworth eventually denied the stay re-
quest, noting correctly that a stay would constitute a reversal of the 
Supreme Court's reinstatement order which exceeded his authority as 
a lower court judge. 264 Similar efforts to secure a stay from the 
Supreme Court also failed.265 
The focus of the Chamber of Commerce and other business lead-
ers in Charlotte on securing review of the busing order rather than 
counseling community acceptance of the order proved significant. 
The Charlotte-Mecklenburg schools opened in September 1970 with a 
considerable degree of turmoil, and the 1970-1971 school. year was 
marred by frequent school disruptions. Indeed, at least six schools 
were temporarily closed on the first day of school due to bomb 
threats; such temporary closures became a fact of life over the course 
of the next few years.266 To be sure, the Chamber of Commerce criti-
cized a threatened school boycott and urged all citizens to "obey the 
law."267 But few political or civic leaders publicly endorsed the deseg-
regation order and most contended, either privately or publicly, that 
the order was wrong and that all available legal appeals should be 
taken. 
In April1971, the United States Supreme Court unanimously af-
firmed McMillan's decision requiring the Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
262. Here's the Text of Resolution, CHARLOTIE NEws, July 14, 1970, at 3B. 
263. Haynsworth Asked to Stay Mix Order, CHARLOTIE NEws, Aug. 13, 1970, at 2A. 
264. Judge Haynsworth: No Authority to Postpone Desegregation Order, CHARLOTIE OB-
SERVER, Aug. 18, 1970, at 1A. 
265. Four Cities Lose 11th Hour Appeal, CHARLOTIE OBSERVER, Aug. 26, 1970, at 1A. 
266. The Legacy of Busing Hearings A Tune for Remembering Charlotte's Past, CHARLO'ITE 
OBSERVER, Jan. 10, 1988, at 1C. 
267. C of C Urges Quiet School Opening, CHARLOTIE NEws, Aug. 31, 1970, at 1A. 
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School Board to engage in extensive busing to overcome residential 
segregation.268 The Court acknowledged that extensive school busing 
imposed a burden on the school system, but concluded that McMillan 
had properly decided that such busing was required to overcome the 
effects of past segregation: 
All things being equal, with no history of discrimination, it might 
well be desirable to assign pupils to schools nearest their homes. 
But all things are not equal in a system that has been deliberately 
constructed and maintained to enforce racial segregation. 
In these circumstances, we find no basis for holding that local school 
authorities may not be required to employ bus transportation as one 
tool of school desegregation.269 
In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision, many of the city's 
leaders counseled acceptance of the Court's mandate. The Charlotte 
Observer editorialized that "all citizens who have based their opposi-
tion to Judge McMillan's orders on the grounds that they couldn't 
take the word of one man, now have the highest authority in the land 
saying the same thing."270 But many members of the community, with 
considerable representation on the School Board, still could not abide 
by the assignment of their children to schools in black neighborhoods. 
During the school board elections of May 1970, staunch anti-busing 
candidates had captured all three open seats, and even after the 
Supreme Court's decision, continued to oppose the court's busing 
plan.271 Since most of the other political and business leaders in the 
city said little about the busing controversy during the early 1970s-
and indeed, many had removed their children from the public schools 
in favor of private schools272-these anti-busing school board mem-
bers dominated the public discourse and helped keep the city in tur-
moil for three more years. Congressional efforts in 1972 and 1973 to 
enact a constitutional amendment banning the use of school busing 
for purposes of desegregation, though unsuccessful, undermined ef-
forts in Charlotte to secure community acceptance of the new re-
268. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971). For an excellent 
discussion of the Supreme Court's deliberations in the Swann case, see BERNARD SCHwARTZ, 
SwANN's WAY: THE ScHOOL BusiNG CASE AND THE SuPREME CouRT (1986). 
269. Swann, 402 U.S. at 28, 30. 
270. Charlotte's Day in Court 20 Years Ago This Week, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Apr. 14, 
1991, at 1C. 
271. DENNIS J. LoRD, SPATIAL PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND BUSING 26-
27 (1977). 
272. Interview with Robert Culbertson, supra note 239. 
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gime.27 3 "Just when we thought we had all that behind us," Charlotte-
Mecklenburg School Superintendent William Self complained in 1972, 
"the political pot is astir with it again and threatens to set us back."274 
Significantly, the staff of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg schools prepared 
a report during the 1971-1972 school year on student disruptions and 
placed much of the blame on the Board itself: 
The prevailing attitude on the part of members of the Board of Ed-
ucation has been one of attempting to meet the letter of the court 
order rather than finding ways to implement the spirit of the orders. 
This attitude has generally been reflected throughout the commu-
nity. There is an apparent need for more positive community lead-
ership and support for the schools.275 
In March 1972, the Mayor's Charlotte-Mecklenburg Community Re-
lations Committee, a successor to Brookshire's earlier Mayor's Com-
mittee, issued its own report, concluding that the Board had failed the 
community in its leadership and had helped divide the community. 
The report called for responsible leadership from the city's elected 
and civic leaders. 276 
The Community Relations Committee had indeed identified the 
critical issue: failure of community leadership. Nine years earlier, 
Mayor Brookshire had met with the president of the Chamber of 
Commerce and the city's leading business owners and within a few 
months had quietly ensured the operation of the city's public accom-
modations on a nondiscriminatory basis, thereby retaining firm con-
trol of the city's desegregation agenda and thwarting considerable 
public disruption. Now, in 1972, the Chamber of Commerce, the 
mayor, and most other elected officials-with the exception of the 
School Board-did little while the schools were consumed with con-
troversy over school busing. In the vacuum, a handful of obstreperous 
school board members dominated the public discourse and kept the 
schools enmeshed in turmoil. 
273. Antagonism towards school busing to overcome racial balance had spread throughout 
the nation in response to the Swann decision. In early 1972, both Houses of Congress held 
widely publicized hearings that included consideration of a proposed constitutional amendment 
prohibiting busing for purposes of achieving racial balance. Although Congress ultimately re-
jected the anti-busing constitutional amendment, it continued to debate the busing issue for the 
next several years and did enact some legislation that limited busing in certain contexts. See 
Gary Orfield, Congress, the President, and Anti-Busing Legislation, 1966-1974,4 J. LAW & Eo. 81 
(1975). 
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at 2D. 
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In the meantime, Judge McMillan permitted the Board to substi-
tute its own desegregation plan for the plan drafted by the judge's 
consultant in 1970. From the beginning, McMillan had strongly pre-
ferred a desegregation plan drafted by the Board rather than the 
court. Thus, in 1971, he allowed the Board to develop its own deseg-
regation plan, but insisted that the Board ensure that no school would 
have a majo~ity black population.277 The Board, however, remained 
embroiled in conflict, as some members favored a plan that excluded 
the wealthier neighborhoods of southeast Charlotte from the busing 
burden altogether on account of fears of white flight, some members 
favored a busing plan that distributed the burden evenly throughout 
the city, and some members favoring continued resistance to the 
court's intrusions. For the next three years, the Board remained badly 
divided as to what course of action to take. 
In the fall of 1973, a coalition of neighborhood and community 
groups emerged that lobbied the Board to create a busing plan that 
would fairly distribute the busing burden on all segments of the com-
munity. This self-proclaimed "Citizens Advisory Group" represented 
an extraordinary array of disparate interests-black and white, busing 
champions and busing opponents-but they were united in the view 
that the time had come to forge consensus around an assignment plan 
that the entire community could live with.278 In time, this collection of 
community and neighborhood interest groups would shoulder the 
civic role long assumed by the Chamber of Commerce as the mediator 
of community conflict. 
The coordinator of the Advisory Group, Margaret Ray, knew 
Judge McMillan personally and in early 1974 met privately with the 
judge to explain her group's views. Ray informed the judge that her 
group favored an assignment plan that would distribute the burden of 
busing as evenly as possible throughout the city, including the wealth-
ier neighborhoods of southeast Charlotte that the Board had contin-
ued to protect. McMillan believed that the exemption of southeast 
Charlotte from the busing burden had contributed to the instability of 
277. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 328 F. Supp. 1346, 1347 (W.D.N.C. 
1971). 
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the Board's assignment plan and to the widespread belief that the plan 
was unfair. McMillan encouraged Ray to develop an assignment plan 
along the lines she had outlined.279 
In a February 1974 report to the School Board, the Advisory 
Group set out in general language the proposal that Ray had commu-
nicated in private to McMillan.280 The Board, however, rejected the 
Advisory Group's recommendations. Although McMillan had di-
rected the Board to devise an assignment plan that would include 
southeast Charlotte, the Board persisted in its refusal to do so.281 
Confronted with the Board's recalcitrance, McMillan, in April, or-
dered the Advisory Group to appear in court to set forth its recom-
mendations for an assignment plan.282 In doing so, McMillan gave 
enormous legitimacy to the Advisory Group's proposal as a serious 
alternative to that of the elected school board. 
In response to the court's order, the Advisory Group presented 
its own pupil assignment plan to the court in late April which pro-
vided for large numbers of white students from southeast Charlotte to 
attend schools in black neighborhoods.283 School Board Chair Poe at-
tacked the plan as "potentially disastrous" and predicted extensive 
white flight from the public school system if it were adopted.284 Yet 
the PTA presidents of several southeast Charlotte schools disagreed, 
predicting that southeast Charlotte would accept the plan. Moreover, 
County Commission Chair W.T. Harris weighed in with his support, 
announcing that he thought the entire city would support a busing 
plan that eliminated the inequities and instabilities of the past few 
years.285 
Harris, one of the city's most prominent business leaders, grew 
increasingly frustrated with the Board's recalcitrance and increasingly 
vocal about his frustration. During the summer of 1973, Harris had 
told a reporter that "the Supreme Court has already ruled that Meek-
279. Interview with Margaret Ray, in Charlotte, N.C. (Oct. 15, 1992). 
280. Minutes, Special Meeting of the Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education (Feb. 11, 
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lenburg County is going to carry out Judge McMillan's order. I think 
we should get down and carry out the educational program. "286 After 
the Advisory Group unveiled its proposed assignment plan to the 
Court, Harris met privately with McMillan to ascertain what must be 
done to put the desegregation controversy to rest. McMillan told 
Harris that the matter could not be resolved until the Board agreed to 
include southeast Charlotte in the busing plan.287 Thereafter, Harris 
contacted key community leaders, urging their support for the Advi-
sory Group plan; as a result of Harris' efforts, the Chamber of Com-
merce announced its support for the plan.288 
Confronted with growing community support for the Advisory 
Group plan, the Board decided in May 1974 to enter into negotiations 
with Ray to devise an acceptable plan. For the next several weeks, 
Ray met daily with a Board representative during which they ham-
mered out an assignment plan along the lines proposed by the Advi-
sory Group.289 Shortly thereafter, the NAACP endorsed the new 
assignment plan as did a majority of the Board members.290 In July 
1974, McMillan approved the new assignment plan, thereby bringing 
an end to the school desegregation controversy in Charlotte.291 Aided 
by the election of three new members in May 1974 who favored a 
conciliatory approach toward McMillan and accepted the reality of 
school busing,292 the Board entered a new era. For the next several 
years, the Board aggressively pursued a policy of retaining integrated 
schools. Although no longer under the supervision of the court, the 
Board would continue to modify its pupil assignments to ensure the 
retention of a fully integrated school system.293 
The Citizens' Advisory group played a critical role in the resolu-
tion of the busing controversy, entering a vaccuum created by the si-
lence of the city's traditional white leadership. In the process, the 
Advisory Group helped transform political power in the city of 
Charlotte. 
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During the 1950s and 1960s, Charlotte's politics had been domi-
nated by a small group of white businessmen, most of whom lived in 
southeast Charlotte. Throughout that time period, the vast majority 
of the city's school board members, city council members, county 
commissioners, and members of the General Assembly resided in the 
southeast section of the city.294 Yet during the early 1970s, scores of 
community and neighborhood groups sprang up throughout the city 
and county, prompted by both the desegregation controversy and 
broader neighborhood preservation concerns. The Citizens Advisory 
Group gave a voice to these disparate groups. 
This emergence of political activists throughout the city and 
county eventually led, in 1977, to the creation of a partial ward system 
for electing members of the city council replacing an at-large system. 
The days of the city's political domination by a small group of Cham-
ber of Commerce leaders from the southeast had ended. The election 
of 1985 was indicative of this new state of affairs. That year, an Afri-
can American, Harvey Gantt, won his second term as mayor, while 
the eleven-member city council consisted of six white women, two Af-
rican-American men, one Jewish man, and two other white men; none 
of the members came from the old business elite of southeast Char-
lotte.295 Charlotte had survived a tumultuous transition to a new set 
of racial demands, but the default of the white business elite had led 
to a broadening of political and social power throughout the city. 
CONCLUSION 
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Charlotte won a reputation as 
one of the most racially progressive cities in the South on account of 
its voluntary desegregation of its schools and public accommodations. 
But it would be a mistake to interpret this desegregation as indicative 
of a superior moral climate in Charlotte when it came to matters of 
race. Rather, these early desegregation efforts were due in large mea-
sure to the. ability of the city's black community to use threatened and 
actual litigation and public demonstrations to pressure the white busi-
ness elite into facilitating racial change. Although most of the city's 
white business leadership probably opposed racial mixing, hesitations 
about token integration were trumped by the desire to retain control 
294. Hanchett, supra note 25, at 510-12. 
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of the desegregation process and to avoid racial strife that might harm 
the city's favorable business climate. 
The speed with which southern cities responded to the demands 
of the Brown decision during the late 1950s and early 1960s depended 
in significant measure upon the response of the white business com-
munity. In cities like Charlotte and Atlanta, the business community, 
under the leadership of a moderate pro-business mayor, understood 
that desegregation would translate into increased business opportuni-
ties and thus took the lead in desegregation efforts. But Charlotte's 
busing crisis of the late 1960s and early 1970s tested the city's business 
elite in an unparalleled manner. Although this elite would eventually 
embrace and promote the city's busing plan, their silence delayed res-
olution of the busing controversy and unwittingly contributed to an 
eventual transformation in the city's political structure. 
